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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS ON FISCAL POLICY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
By 
 
TAMOYA A.L. CHRISTIE 
 
August 2011 
 
Committee Chair:  Dr. Felix Rioja 
Major Department:  Economics 
 
This dissertation comprises two essays that elaborate on different aspects of the 
relationship between government expenditure and long-term economic growth. The first 
essay explores how the size of government, as measured by the level of spending, affects 
growth. Theoretical models suggest a nonlinear relationship; however, testing this 
hypothesis empirically in cross-country studies is complicated by the endogeneity of 
government spending and the accurate identification of turning points. This paper 
examines the nonlinear hypothesis by incorporating threshold analysis in a cross-country 
growth regression. The methodology utilizes a sample-splitting framework and follows 
an objective strategy for identifying and testing changes in the slope. Using a broad panel 
of countries over the period 1971-2005, the results show evidence in favor of a nonlinear 
effect, but not of the form predicted by theory. When total government spending is low, 
there is no statistically significant effect on economic growth. However, after passing a 
certain threshold (26 percent for developed countries and 33 percent for developing 
countries) government spending exhibits a negative effect on growth. This pattern 
remains the same even when productive government spending is singled out. 
xii 
 
The second essay develops a dynamic macroeconomic model to explore how 
variations in the composition and financing of government expenditures affect economic 
growth in the long-run. The model is used to analyze how public investment spending 
funded by taxes or borrowing affects long-term output growth. We also examine the 
effect of varying the composition of public expenditure, shifting between consumption 
and investment spending, or re-allocating between different types of public investment. 
In addition, we use alternative parameterizations of the model to explore how the effects 
on growth change under extreme initial fiscal conditions such as high average tax rates, 
debt ratios and public consumption spending. The model is calibrated to reflect economic 
conditions in the seven largest Latin American economies during the period 1990 to 
2008. We find that, where tax rates are not already high, funding public investment by 
raising taxes may increase long-run growth. If existing tax rates are high, then public 
investment is only growth-enhancing if funded by restructuring the composition of public 
spending. Interestingly, using debt to finance new public investment compromises 
growth, regardless of the initial fiscal condition. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The general increase in the average size of government over time has precipitated 
fears that progressively larger governments will compromise economic growth. This has 
prompted calls to scale back government activities and cut budgets. However, the areas 
of government spending which typically end up being cut during fiscal adjustment are 
categories associated with productive expenditure—public investment in physical 
infrastructure, education and healthcare, for example. Spending in these areas has been 
shown to have a positive impact on aggregate production and is considered crucial for 
long-term growth and development. Policymakers risk doing more harm than good to 
their economies over the long-run if the appropriate level and composition of public 
expenditure is not maintained.  
Of course, one of the major challenges facing governments is how to finance such 
expenditures given binding fiscal constraints. Moreover, it has been shown that diverse 
types of government expenditure may have conflicting effects on growth given different 
sources of financing. Income taxes tend to be distortionary creating disincentives to 
saving and investment, while deficit financing may crowd out private investment 
(Agénor, 2004; Kneller, Bleaney, & Gemmell, 1999). It is therefore also important to 
know how government spending can be most efficiently allocated and financed to bring 
about the best growth results, particularly in the context of adverse fiscal conditions such 
as already high tax rates, large fiscal deficits and growing debt stocks.  
This dissertation comprises two essays that examine different aspects of the 
relationship between government spending and long-term economic growth. The first 
essay explores the topical issue of size, as measured by the level of government spending 
(as a share of GDP). The paper empirically tests the validity of existing theory which 
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stipulates there is a nonlinear relationship between government size and economic 
growth; such that government spending is growth-enhancing at low levels but growth-
retarding at high levels, with the optimal size occurring somewhere in between. The 
second essay complements the first by delving into issues concerning the optimal 
composition and financing of public expenditures, and how these vary depending on 
heterogeneous fiscal conditions across countries. The premise is that the appropriate 
fiscal strategy in one country may not be the same in another where fiscal conditions are 
more stringent.  
In the first essay, the objective of empirically testing the nonlinear hypothesis in 
cross-country studies is complicated by the endogeneity of government spending and the 
accurate identification of turning points. We attempt to overcome these problems and in 
so doing make several contributions to the existing literature. First, in terms of 
methodology, we incorporate threshold analysis in the cross-country growth regression. 
This methodology utilizes a sample-splitting framework and follows an objective strategy 
for identifying and testing changes in the slope. In addition, we apply generalized method 
of moments (GMM) dynamic panel techniques to address potential endogeneity of 
government expenditure. Second, with respect to data, we employ an updated data set 
with a broad cross-section of countries over a long time span. Pulling data from the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Government Finance Statistics (GFS), the sample 
contains 136 countries over the period 1971-2005. Most important, this data source offers 
a more comprehensive measure of government size by using total government 
expenditure (excluding interest payments) as opposed to government consumption 
expenditure as the proxy. The consumption measure, though widely used in empirical 
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studies, does not include public capital formation and so cannot fully capture the 
productivity-enhancing effects of government services. Moreover, the GFS data contain 
sectoral decompositions of government spending, which allows us to isolate ―productive‖ 
as opposed to ―unproductive‖ elements of government spending from the total. This 
enables us to also explore, in broad terms, different effects due to the composition of 
public spending. 
 We find evidence to support a nonlinear effect, but not of the form suggested by 
the nonlinear hypothesis. For total government spending above a critical size threshold, 
we find a negative effect on growth. However, this effect is negligible for government 
size below the threshold, and only displays a positive—though not statistically 
significant—coefficient when productive government spending is distinguished from the 
total. We also find evidence to suggest that other factors may affect the nature of the 
relationship between government size and growth.  The level of economic development 
and the quality of government are two such factors. When we analyze developed and 
developing countries separately, the threshold location is lower for developed countries. 
In addition, high quality governance mitigated some of the negative effects so that 
nonlinearities were more pronounced in countries with less effective governments.  
The findings of this study have significant public policy implications as they offer 
some insight to the policy debate about the optimal size of government, and how this 
varies according to the level of economic development of a country. Indeed, the concern 
about large governments is not misplaced as several countries have exceeded the critical 
threshold identified in this study. Further expansion of government will have negative 
effects on long-run growth in these economies. Fortunately, the evidence also shows that 
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improvements to the quality of government can dampen these negative effects. On 
another note, the negligible growth effects of government spending below the threshold 
imply serious offsetting influences, which mitigate the potential benefits from increased 
public spending. The extent to which the mitigating factors are due to the composition 
and financing of public expenditures is explored in the second essay.  
The second essay of the dissertation develops a two-sector endogenous growth 
model which is capable of explaining how variations in the composition and financing of 
government expenditures affect economic growth rates in the long-run. The model is 
used to analyze how public investment spending funded by taxes (income or 
consumption) or by borrowing affects long-term output growth. We also examine the 
effect of varying the composition of public expenditure, shifting the proportions of 
productive versus unproductive spending, or re-allocating between different types of 
productive expenditure. In addition, we explore how heterogeneous fiscal conditions 
affect the implications for growth. Specifically, we use alternative parameterizations of 
the model to simulate extreme initial fiscal conditions such as high average tax rates, debt 
stock ratios and government consumption spending. The implications of the model are 
tested using quantitative methods. The model is calibrated to reflect economic conditions 
in the seven largest Latin American economies during the period 1990 to 2008. The Latin 
American countries provide a suitable testing ground given their debt history and diverse 
fiscal adjustment experiences.  
The study makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, we take into 
account that government expenditure is not homogenous and spending in different sectors 
will have diverse productivities. Thus, we move beyond the standard practice of broadly 
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categorizing government spending merely as ―productive‖ or ―unproductive‖ and 
explicitly recognize the heterogeneity within productive government expenditure itself. 
To do this, we develop a two-sector endogenous growth model in which public 
investment is divided between physical and human capital, allowing for distinct output 
effects from each type of spending. Second, the theoretical model moves away from the 
balanced government budget constraint typical of the literature and opens up the revenue 
options of the government to include deficit financing. This more realistically captures 
the actual situation of the majority of economies today and allows us to explore the extent 
to which variations in the sources of financing affect the relationship between 
government spending and long-term growth. Third, we pay particular attention to how 
these effects change under different initial fiscal conditions (such as high tax rates and 
large debt stocks), an aspect not previously explored in the growth literature.  
We find that the effect of productive government spending on growth is not 
necessarily positive, but varies with the overall structure of total public expenditure, the 
method of funding and the existing fiscal conditions. This helps to explain the negligible 
effect of government spending below the threshold found in the first essay. If existing tax 
rates are high, then funding productive spending by further increases in the tax rate, 
actually lowers long-run growth. In this case, public investment is only growth-enhancing 
if financed by restructuring the composition of public spending. Interestingly, using debt 
to finance new public investment compromises growth in the long-run, regardless of the 
initial fiscal condition. 
The dissertation proceeds with a more detailed discussion of each of the two 
essays. 
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ESSAY 1 
THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON ECONOMIC GROWTH:  
TESTING THE NONLINEAR HYPOTHESIS 
 
Introduction 
There has been ongoing concern that large and growing governments have 
deleterious effects on the long-run growth of their economies. The usual policy 
prescription calls for a scaling back of government activity and budgets, constraining 
public spending from growing faster than output. In countries facing fiscal imbalances 
and high debt burdens, this has prompted wide-ranging fiscal consolidation programs to 
reduce government spending (IMF, 2003). However, parallel to this thrust has been a call 
for ―fiscal space‖ in which governments argue for room in their budgets to allow for the 
provision of productive public goods that will foster economic growth (Heller, 2005).
1
 
These opposing policies are based on conflicting views on the role of government in the 
development process. 
The theoretical literature offers support for both positive and negative effects of 
government size on economic growth. Government provision of public goods such as 
infrastructure, rule of law, and protection of property rights—the core areas of 
government – is thought to be conducive to growth (Aschauer, 1989; Ram, 1986). 
However, as the size of government increases, distortionary effects of high taxes and 
public borrowing, diminishing returns to public capital, rent-seeking activities and 
bureaucratic inefficiencies become more prevalent. Public choice theorists argue that 
                                                 
1
 Productive government expenditure may include, inter alia, spending on highways, roads, education, 
health, national defense or rule of law (Gramlich, 1994). Conversely, unproductive government spending 
may be regarded as government consumption services like social security and welfare payments. 
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eventually the latter factors dominate and marginal government expenditure exerts a 
negative effect on growth (Barth, Keleher, & Russek, 1990; Gwartney, Lawson, & 
Holcombe, 1998). 
These ideas have been formalized in the endogenous growth literature. Barro 
(1990) introduces a non-monotonic relationship through the rising distortionary effect of 
increasing tax rates which are required to fund ever larger government expenditure. In the 
Barro model, when government is relatively small, growth rises with increases in 
productive government services as the positive effects of more public goods dominates, 
but beyond some critical point the disincentive effects of higher taxes on savings and 
investment reduce the growth rate. If the nonlinear hypothesis is valid and the effect of 
government spending on long-run economic growth does vary with its size, this would 
not only help to explain the ambiguous findings in the empirical growth literature, but 
would also offer clearer guidelines on the appropriate fiscal policy prescription for a 
country of a particular government size. Furthermore, implicit in the nonlinear hypothesis 
is the existence of some optimal size of government which would maximize economic 
growth. Having an indication of this hypothetical optimum, and where a country stands 
relative to it, should be of potential interest to policymakers. It must be noted, of course, 
that the optimal point is likely to differ for each country depending on various factors 
which may attentuate or accentuate the break point. Some factors we are able to control 
for, while others we are not. 
 This chapter tests the validity of Barro’s nonlinear hypothesis on the relationship 
between government spending and economic growth. Currently, there is no clear 
consensus in the empirical growth literature on how government spending affects 
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growth.
2
 This may be attributable to the fact that the possibility of a nonlinear 
relationship has been largely ignored. Those studies which have tried to incorporate a 
possible nonlinear effect have been mainly limited to single-country investigations, using 
time series data (Chen & Lee, 2005; Grossman, 1988; Mittnik & Neumann, 2003; Vedder 
& Gallaway, 1998). Among the relatively few cross-country studies that have explored a 
non-monotonic relationship (Afonso & Furceri, 2010; Kelly, 1997; Park, 2006), the 
tendency is to include a quadratic term, which usually fails to detect any evidence of 
nonlinear effects in the relationship. This may be attributable to the fact that a quadratic 
specification assumes one particular form of nonlinearity, but the true effect may be 
present in other forms not appropriately modeled by a quadratic term. 
Nevertheless, some early evidence in favor of the nonlinear hypothesis using 
cross-country data has been provided by Sheehey (1993) and Karras (1996). By dividing 
a broad sample of 102 countries according to the initial size of government, Sheehey 
finds that increasing the share of government spending to GDP has a positive (negative) 
effect on growth when the initial government expenditure share is below (above) 15 
percent.
3
 While these findings are consistent with the nonlinear hypothesis, the choice of 
a 15 percent government share threshold is arbitrary, which creates uncertainty about the 
correct identification of the growth-maximizing point. Karras takes a different approach 
to the nonlinearity question. Although he does not directly test the relationship between 
government size and growth, his methodology allows him to determine the productivity 
                                                 
2
 Ram (1986) and Rubinson (1977) are among the few who find clear evidence in favor of a positive 
relationship. Barro (1989) and Kormendi and Meguire (1986) find no significant relationship. On the other 
hand, studies which find a negative effect include Afonso and Furceri (2010), Folster and Henrekson 
(2001), Grier and Tullock (1987) and Landau (1983).  
3
 Sheehey (1993) also searches for nonlinearities in government spending on the basis of economic 
development. He finds that increasing the share of government in low-income countries has a positive 
effect, but increases in high-income countries have a negative effect. 
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of government spending and identify whether or not government services are optimally 
provided.
4
 Moreover, he is able to test the relationship between the marginal productivity 
of government services and government size. He finds this relationship to be negative, 
implying that the public sector is more productive when small—a feature consistent with 
the nonlinear hypothesis.
5
  
More recently, Varoudakis, Tiongson, and Pushak (2007) also investigate the 
nonlinear hypothesis for a group of 25 transition economies between 1992 and 2004. 
Using spline regressions, they experimented with a number of plausible threshold values 
for government size. They eventually settle on a threshold value of 35 percent, which is 
approximately equal to the sample median. They find that at expenditure levels of 35 
percent of GDP or higher, public spending negatively affects growth. However, at levels 
below 35 percent, public sector size had no robust measurable effect. 
This chapter re-examines the relationship between government size and long-run 
economic growth, explicitly accounting for the likelihood of a nonlinear effect. We 
contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, in terms of methodology, we make 
improvements to previous empirical studies by applying threshold analysis (Hansen, 
2000) to a panel of 136 countries. This technique has been widely used as the preferred 
method to identify threshold effects (Adam & Bevan, 2005; Chen & Lee, 2005; Falvey, 
Foster, & Greenaway, 2006; Haque & Kneller, 2009; Khan & Senhadji, 2001), 
particularly when the variable of interest is observable, but the position of the threshold is 
not known. The methodology uses a sample-splitting framework and follows an objective 
                                                 
4
 Karras (1996) takes advantage of the ―Barro rule‖ which states that government services are optimally 
provided when their marginal product equals unity. 
5
 Furthermore, he calculates the optimal government size to be 23 percent for the average country in his 
sample, ranging from 14 percent for the average OECD country, to 33 percent in South America. 
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strategy for identifying and testing changes in the slope. One important advantage of 
threshold analysis is that it avoids the ad hoc, subjective pre-selection of threshold 
values—a major critique of previous studies. In addition, we also apply generalized 
method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel techniques to address potential endogeneity 
of government expenditure, which is measured as a share of GDP. Second, with respect 
to data, we employ an updated data set with a broad cross-section of countries over a long 
time span. Pulling data from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS), our sample 
contains 136 countries over the period 1971-2005. Most important, this data source offers 
a more comprehensive measure of government size by using total government 
expenditure (excluding interest payments) as opposed to government consumption 
expenditure as the proxy. The consumption measure, though widely used in empirical 
studies, does not include public capital formation and so cannot fully capture the 
productivity-enhancing effects of government services. Moreover, the GFS data contain 
sectoral decompositions of government spending, which allows us to isolate ―productive‖ 
as opposed to ―unproductive‖ elements of government spending from the total. This 
enables us to also explore, in broad terms, different effects due to the composition of 
public spending. 
The results of the study suggest evidence in favor of a nonlinear effect, but not as 
predicted by Barro’s nonlinear hypothesis (Barro, 1990). When total government 
spending is low, we find no statistically significant effect on economic growth. However, 
after passing a certain threshold (26 percent for developed countries and 33 percent for 
developing countries) government spending exhibits a strong negative effect on growth. 
Interestingly, this pattern remains the same even when productive government spending 
11 
 
 
is singled out. The results are qualitatively robust to various specifications and estimation 
techniques. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides a description of the 
data and the empirical methodology used in the analysis. The results are discussed in the 
third section. Finally, we summarize the findings and conclude with some policy 
implications.  
 
Data and Empirical Methodology 
 
Data 
This paper incorporates threshold analysis into a standard growth equation to test 
for a nonlinear relationship between government size and long-run economic growth. As 
established in the growth literature (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Levine & Renelt, 
1992), real output per capita growth is modeled as a function of government size (total 
government expenditure/GDP) and control variables. The set of controls includes initial 
GDP per capita, the ratio of domestic investment to GDP, the average inflation rate, and 
openness to trade (as defined by the sum of exports and imports to GDP). The initial level 
of GDP controls for the convergence effect noted in the Solow-Swan (Solow, 1956; Swan 
1956) model.
6
 Domestic investment captures the positive effects of physical capital 
accumulation. The latter variables are controls for the effects of macroeconomic policy. 
Openness is presumed to affect growth positively, while high inflation adversely affects 
growth. 
                                                 
6
 Initial GDP is measured as the value at the start of each five-year period and so varies over time. 
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The data used for the analysis comprise a panel of 136 countries over the period 
1971-2005.
7
 The fiscal variables are from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics and 
we use data for the consolidated central government.
8
 One advantage of this data source 
is that it also contains sectoral decompositions of total government spending, which 
allows us to isolate productive elements of government spending from the total. Using the 
functional classification of the GFS, we define productive government spending as the 
sum of expenditure on education, health, housing and transport and communication.
9
 The 
national accounts and inflation variables are obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) 2007. Since the relationship of interest is between long-
run growth and government size, in keeping with convention (Bleaney, Gemmell, & 
Kneller, 2001), we take 5-year averages of the data to smooth out changes due to cyclical 
effects. This procedure also eliminates potential econometric biases due to endogeneity 
problems arising from short-run cyclical simultaneity. The averaging operation results in 
a reconstructed panel of seven observations per country, which gives a potential sample 
size of 952. However, because of missing data, the usable sample is reduced in various 
specifications of the model.
10
 
                                                 
7
 Note, fiscal variables are available since 1972. 
8
 The choice to use central government data rather than general government was based on availability. The 
use of data from the consolidated central government means we are not capturing all government 
expenditure items in countries with a decentralized system. However, Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996) 
using the same data source, conducted robustness checks on a subset of countries which had data available 
for general government and found results in the two data sets to be consistent.  
9
 This definition is reasonably accepted in the literature, variations of which have also been employed by 
Adam and Bevan (2005), Bleaney et al. (2001), Kneller et al. (1999) and Park (2006). We normalize the 
variable as a percentage of GDP. 
10
 The limitations on the data emanate primarily from the fiscal variables which have a more limited 
coverage than the WDI. There are also gaps in the early years predominantly from developing countries 
whose statistical reporting capabilities may not have been well-developed at that time. Given a systematic 
exclusion of developing country data in the earlier periods, there may be an issue of sample selection bias. 
We check for this in the sensitivity analysis by running regressions for several time periods. 
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Table 1 provides summary statistics for the data and defines the variable 
mnemonics used in the paper. A further breakdown of the sample according to five-year 
averages is presented in Appendix A (Table A1).
11
 For our sample of countries, the 
overall growth rate averaged 2.1 percent per annum. This masks a wide disparity across 
countries and across time. While growth in the OECD countries averaged 2.6 percent per 
annum, the corresponding rate in developing countries was 1.9 percent. Similarly, the 
average size of government (measured as total expenditure to GDP) was 28.1 percent, but 
the difference between high-income and low-income countries was stark, averaging 34.1 
percent and 25.7 percent, respectively. Figure 1 plots the average government size against 
average real GDP per capita growth for each country over the period 1970-2005. A 
preliminary bivariate regression of these cross-sectional data suggests a positive—though 
not statistically significant (p = .159)—relationship between the two variables of interest. 
 
Model Specification and Estimation 
Recall that according to the nonlinear hypothesis, the effect of government 
expenditure on growth will vary depending on the size of government. We first test for 
the presence of turning points or thresholds in the relationship between growth and 
government size by applying the threshold regression model (Hansen, 1996, 1999, 2000). 
The estimated threshold, provided it exists, is then interacted with government size.  
The threshold regression model applied to a standard growth equation for country 
i = 1, …, I and time period t = 1, …, T takes the following form: 
ititititititit uGOVIGOVGOVIGOVXGROWTH  )()( 210   ,   (6) 
                                                 
11
 A detailed description of all variables used in the estimation is also provided in the Appendix (Table A2). 
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and         ittiitu   ’ 
where Xit represents the matrix of control variables, GOV denotes government spending 
as a share of GDP, i is a country-specific fixed effect, t is a time fixed effect and it is a 
normally distributed error term. )(I is an indicator function which takes the value of one 
when the condition inside parentheses is satisfied, and  is the threshold value to be 
determined within the model. We define )(ˆ)'(ˆ)(  uuS  as the residual sum of squares 
of the model in (6) estimated for a threshold level The optimal threshold is then 
           ).(minargˆ 

S        (7) 
ˆ  is found by estimating (6) for all values of government size in the range 13-47 percent 
in one-unit increments.
12
  
 Having identified a potential threshold, it is important to determine whether the 
threshold effect is statistically significant. From equation (6), testing for no threshold 
effects is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis H0: 1 = 2. However, since the null is 
consistent with any arbitrary value of , the threshold cannot be identified using standard 
methods of inference. Hansen (1996, 1999) suggests a bootstrap method to simulate the 
asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio (LR) test of H0 based on: 
    2100 ˆ/)ˆ( SSLR   ,      (8) 
where S0 denotes the residual sum of squares for the model with no threshold and 
2ˆ is 
the estimated error variance in the presence of the threshold, ˆ . The asymptotic 
distribution of LR0 is non-standard and strictly dominates the 
2
 distribution. The 
                                                 
12
 As recommended by Hansen (1999), we restrict the search to values of that allow a minimal percentage 
of the observations to fall within each regime. Here we exclude values of  which fall within the top and 
bottom 5
th
 percentiles of GOV.  
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distribution of LR0 depends in general on the moments of the sample, thus critical values 
cannot be tabulated. However, Hansen shows that a bootstrap procedure attains the first-
order asymptotic distribution, so p-values constructed from the bootstrap are 
asymptotically valid.
13
 
 It is also interesting to know how precisely the threshold has been estimated. The 
asymptotic confidence interval for ˆ  can be constructed from the LR1 statistic 
    21 ˆ/)ˆ()()(  SSLR        (9) 
across the range of values for . We note that LR1() is a simple re-normalization of the 
sequence of sum of squared residuals, S(), and takes the value of zero at ˆ . It can be 
shown that the LR1 statistic tends in distribution to the random variable  with limiting 
distribution .))2/exp(1()Pr(
2xx   The inverse of the distribution, 
),11log(2)(  c  gives the relevant 100% critical value. 
 Once the threshold has been identified and ˆ  proved statistically significant, we 
proceed to estimate equation (6) with standard econometric techniques.
14
 We rely mainly 
on fixed effects estimation, controlling for both time-invariant individual country 
characteristics and time fixed effects.
15
 In addition, we use dynamic panel system 
generalized method of moments (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) 
estimation to account for the possibility of reverse causality between growth and 
                                                 
13
 The bootstrap procedure is outlined in Hansen (1999). 
14
 Chan (1993) and Hansen (2000) show that the dependence of i on the threshold estimate is not of first-
order asymptotic importance, so inference on i can proceed as if the threshold estimate, ˆ , were the true 
value. 
15
 We also considered pooled OLS and two-way random effects models. Based on the log likelihood and 
the adjusted R
2 
for the pooled OLS and a rejection of the null hypothesis in the Hausman test between fixed 
effects and random effects, we choose the fixed effects model as our main method of estimation. 
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government size under Wagner’s law (Easterly & Rebelo, 1993).16 The panel GMM 
estimator has been used extensively (Beck & Levine, 2004; Johansson, 2010; Rioja & 
Valev, 2004) to deal with problems arising from independent variables that are not 
strictly exogenous. It has the advantage of using internal instruments, formulated from 
lags of the endogenous variables themselves. Moreover, the system GMM estimator is 
specifically designed to handle some of the problematic features of panel data such as 
country-specific fixed effects, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within countries.
17
 
 
Results 
 
Threshold Existence  
The threshold regression analysis indicates the existence of thresholds in the 
relationship between growth and government size. Table 2 presents results of the 
estimated location and significance levels of turning points in various sub-samples of the 
data. The asymptotic p-values of the LR0 statistic indicate that the null hypothesis of no 
threshold effects can be rejected at least at the 5 percent significance level for all three 
samples.  
The overall threshold estimate for the full sample is indicated at 33 percent. 
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of observations according to government size and 
                                                 
16 Wagner’s law states that there is a tendency for government expenditure to be higher at higher levels of 
per capita GDP. On the one hand, Wagner’s law may be less of a concern here, since it suggests an 
association between GDP growth and the growth rate, rather than the level, of government expenditure. 
However, to the extent that faster growing economies achieve a higher level of GDP, which has been 
shown to be associated with higher government spending, the possibility of a reverse relationship has to be 
considered. 
17
 The method jointly estimates the regression in first-differences and in levels—with first-differences 
instrumented by lagged levels of the dependent and explanatory variables and levels instrumented by first-
differences of the regressors. The procedure is fully described in Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and 
Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
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GDP growth rates. Of the 557 observations in the full sample, 382 (69 percent) fall below 
the estimated threshold. These observations represent 117 of the 136 countries in the full 
sample. Figure 3 presents the likelihood ratio (LR1) statistics and corresponding 
asymptotic confidence intervals for the threshold estimates.
18
 The large confidence 
interval for the full sample (see panel a), casts doubt on the precision of this estimate. As 
indicated above, the threshold location is likely to be affected by many things. One such 
factor may be that the wide disparities among such a broad group of countries are 
influencing the results (Bose, Holman, & Neanidis, 2007; Gregoriou & Ghosh, 2009; 
Sheehey, 1993). Allowing for parametric heterogeneity between developed and 
developing countries, we re-estimate the thresholds distinguishing between the two 
country groups. This time the results again indicate an expenditure-to-GDP threshold at 
33 percent for developing countries, which is highly significant at the one-percent level.
19
 
More encouragingly, the narrow confidence intervals indicate greater precision of the 
estimate. The second panel in Figure 3 illustrates that the 5 percent critical value crosses 
the normalized LR1 statistic over a narrow range. We can therefore say with 95 percent 
confidence that the true threshold falls within the interval (29, 36).
20
  
For developed countries, Table 2 indicates the presence of threshold effects at 26 
percent, which is below the level of developing countries.
21
 One explanation for the 
lower threshold result could be due to the composition of expenditures. We know that 
                                                 
18
 The confidence interval of the threshold estimate of  consists of those values of government expenditure 
for which the likelihood ratio statistic is less than the critical value. 
19
 For the sample of developing countries, 316 out of 399 observations (79 percent) fall below the threshold 
( = 33); representing 98 out of 108 countries. 
20
 This is consistent with Varoudakis et al. (2007) who found an estimated threshold at 35 percent of total 
government spending for countries in Europe and Central Asia (ECA). It is notably larger than the average 
threshold estimates found by Sheehey (1993) and Karras (1996), who both employed consumption 
expenditure as their measure of government size. 
21
 For the sample of developed countries, 41 out of 158 observations (26 percent) fall below the estimated 
threshold ( = 26); comprising 10 of the 28 developed countries in the study. 
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countries with bigger governments tend to allocate a larger share of total government 
spending to social welfare and transfer payments (Gray, Lane, & Varoudakis, 2007). In 
our estimation sample, developed countries allocate roughly 42 percent of total 
expenditure to unproductive means, 
22
 compared to 30 percent in developing countries. 
To the extent that this kind of spending has to be financed by tax revenues, then the lower 
threshold corresponds to a lower optimal government size predicted by the nonlinear 
hypothesis (Barro, 1990). We note that while the p-values indicate that the coefficients 
for the regimes above and below the threshold are statistically different at least at the 5 
percent level, the wide confidence intervals again restrict our conclusions about the 
precision of this estimate.
23
  
 
Threshold Effects  
Total government spending. 
Table 3 reports the estimated effects of government spending on growth taking 
into account the thresholds identified in the previous exercise. Results on threshold 
effects for the full sample are presented in column 3, with the threshold specified at 33 
percent. For comparison, we also include results for when the model is estimated without 
accounting for nonlinearities (column 1) and when nonlinearities take a quadratic form 
(column 2).
24
  
                                                 
22
 Defined here as the sum of public spending on social security and welfare, recreation and economic 
services (Kneller et al., 1999). 
23
 We also tested for thresholds on various other sub-samples of the data based on geographical region 
(Karras, 1996) and income level. The threshold estimates, while varying slightly, are consistent with our 
main results, though less precisely estimated.  More details are provided in Appendix A. 
24
 The regressions are estimated by two-way fixed effects using the xtreg,fe command in Stata. The 
reported constant is the average value of the fixed effects, derived from a simple reformulation of the basic 
fixed effects model. 
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The main variable of interest is government size, GOV, as measured by total 
government expenditure as a share of GDP. When entered linearly, the coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant, p = .018. A one-percentage point increase in total 
government expenditure reduces per capita real output growth by 0.07 of a percentage 
point. Unsurprisingly, consistent with previous studies, the possibility of a nonlinear 
effect is not captured by a quadratic specification. When a quadratic term on total 
government spending is included, the model fails to find significance for either of the 
fiscal variables.  
The results for the nonlinear model with a threshold on government spending at 
33 percent for the full sample, (column 3) suggest a weak nonlinear effect, but not of the 
form expected from the Barro nonlinear hypothesis. Instead of displaying a positive 
relationship with growth when government is small as would be predicted by the theory, 
the effect of government spending below the threshold is negligible, being neither 
statistically nor economically significant. Beyond the estimated threshold, the effect of 
government spending is negative as expected, but only significant at the 10 percent level, 
p = .095. The growth rate falls by 0.045 percentage points for every unit percentage point 
increase in government size. Standard Wald tests confirm the two coefficients around the 
threshold to be statistically different, p = .053. 
Distinguishing between developed and developing countries gives similar results. 
In developing countries (column 5), there is a significant negative effect only after the 
threshold has been exceeded. For government size below 33 percent, the growth effect is 
negligible. Wald tests show the two coefficients around the threshold to be statistically 
different at a high level of significance, p = .004. In developed countries (column 4), we 
20 
 
 
also note significant differences around the estimated threshold of 26 percent. Above this 
value, larger government size has a deleterious effect on growth but below the threshold, 
there is no statistically significant effect even though the coefficient is negative.  
These results are interesting as they seem to indicate the presence of nonlinearities 
in the government size – growth relationship, but not in line with an expected inverted U- 
shape. This would provide one explanation why previous studies using a quadratic 
specification failed to capture the nonlinear effect. The quadratic model a priori restricts 
the relationship between government size and long-run growth to a particular functional 
form, which may or may not be in line with the true data-generating process. The 
threshold model does not make this assumption but rather allows the data to suggest the 
model specification. In this case, the data show that the nonlinear effect we investigate 
does not display a smooth turning point around a defined optimum, but rather takes the 
form of a kink where there is a distinct change in the slope. The threshold model is better 
suited than the quadratic model to detect this kind of nonlinearity.  
We note that the control variables have the expected signs and are all statistically 
significant. The negative coefficient on initial GDP confirms the conditional convergence 
hypothesis within a 5-year time span. Also as expected, increases in inflation reduce 
growth, but the coefficient is small and weakly significant, p = .076. The coefficient on 
the share of investment as a proportion of GDP is positive and highly significant, p < 
.001. A one-percentage point increase in investment can stimulate long-run growth by 0.2 
of a percentage point. This compares favorably with previous studies (Adam & Bevan, 
2005; Bose et al., 2007). Finally, openness to trade (OPEN) also indicates a positive and 
statistically significant effect at the five percent level, p = .034. 
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Endogeneity. 
As previously discussed, one concern is that some of the explanatory variables, 
including our main variable of interest, may not be strictly exogenous thus causing the 
coefficients to be biased. We account for possible endogeneity issues by applying 
dynamic panel GMM techniques to equation (6). Given observed differences between 
developed and developing countries, we reestimate the full sample GMM equation 
including income-class dummies for each country.
25,
 
26
 The results for the GMM 
regression on the full sample are presented in Table 4. For comparison, we provide the 
results of the linear and quadratic models in the first two columns. We also include the 
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation and the Hansen J test of over-identifying 
restrictions.
27
 Both tests support the validity of the model in each regression.  
Focusing on the threshold specification, column 3, we note that GMM estimation 
indicates considerable change in the slope coefficients around the threshold value, but 
neither side exhibits statistical significance. The negative coefficient above the threshold 
is consistent with the FE model, but under GMM the standard errors are larger. 
Interestingly, for government spending below the threshold, the GMM estimation returns 
a positive coefficient. Not surprisingly, when the model is estimated only for developing 
countries, column 4, results are more in line with the fixed effects specification, with a 
weakly significant negative coefficient above the threshold, (p = .070), and no 
statistically significant effect below. This helps to reassure us that the main results are not 
                                                 
25
 Dynamic panel GMM does not perform well in small samples with many regressors making it unsuitable 
for estimation of the developed country sub-sample which has only 158 observations (Roodman, 2009b). 
26
 We use the World Bank country classification which groups countries into low-income, lower-middle 
income, upper-middle income and high-income country groups. 
27
 The Arellano-Bond test determines whether the differenced error term has first-order or second-order 
serial correlation. Second-order serial correlation implies that some lags are invalid as instruments. The 
Hansen J statistic tests the overall validity of the instruments (Roodman, 2009a). 
 
22 
 
 
merely an artifact of endogeneity biases. While the coefficients on the control variables 
are of different magnitudes, the signs are largely as expected with different levels of 
significance. The only exception is OPEN which has an unexpected negative sign. In 
addition, as in the fixed effects model, when nonlinearities are ignored, the coefficient on 
the government size variable is strongly negative and significant, p = .022. However, 
under GMM it is about twice the magnitude.  
Productive government spending. 
Even though the results show that the effect of government spending below the 
threshold is statistically insignificant, we would have expected the coefficient to at least 
display a positive sign. One possible explanation for this puzzle is in noting that the 
theory makes a distinction between productive and unproductive public spending and it is 
the productive portion which is growth-enhancing, while the unproductive share is 
theorized to have a negative effect. In analyzing the total spending, we are indeed 
confounding the two effects, which may have offsetting influences. We therefore try to 
isolate what may be considered as productive elements of government spending. Using 
the functional classification of the GFS, we define productive government spending, 
PR_GOV, as the sum of expenditure on education, health, housing, transport and 
communication, relative to GDP.
28
 Similar definitions have been used by Adam and 
Bevan (2005), Kneller et al. (1999) and Park (2006). We note that more detailed 
information is required to construct this variable and many missing observations result in 
a smaller sample size, reducing the number of observations from 557 to 394 in some 
specifications.  
                                                 
28
 Several empirical studies have shown public spending in these particular areas to be positively associated 
with economic growth (Aschauer, 1989; Easterly & Rebelo, 1993; Blankenau, Simpson, & Tomljanovich, 
2007). 
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The regression results focusing on productive government spending are presented 
in Table 5. In column 1, we estimate a linear specification without controlling for total 
government size. The results are similar to the comparable case using total spending. In 
column 2 we re-estimate the baseline threshold model (equation 6) replacing total 
government spending with productive government spending, but maintaining total size as 
the variable on which the threshold is based.
29
 Now, in line with expectations, the 
coefficients on the fiscal variables change sign around the threshold value. Below the 
threshold, when total government spending is less than 33 percent, the coefficient on 
productive government spending is positive, though still not statistically significant. 
When the total size of government increases beyond the threshold value further increases 
in productive spending have a negative significant effect on growth, so that even 
expenditure on productive activities does not translate into long-run growth. In columns 3 
and 4, we re-estimate the productive spending models using dynamic GMM to account 
for endogeneity. We find that the results are consistent with the fixed effects 
specification. 
We also estimated the model separately for developed and developing countries 
(Table A3 in Appendix A). When focusing on productive expenditure, the government 
size threshold value for developed countries was higher at 32 percent while that for 
developing countries remained the same at 33 percent. A statistically significant change 
in slope was evident around the threshold value in either case, but only the developing 
countries displayed a change in sign. 
                                                 
29
 The model estimated was 
ititititititit uGOVIGOVPRGOVIGOVPRXGROWTH  )(_)(_ 210  . A new 
threshold search revealed ˆ  at 33 percent, consistent with the original sample. Testing the null hypothesis 
for the difference in slopes gives an LR0 statistic of 10.968 which is significant at the 1 percent level. 
Furthermore, 95 percent confidence intervals indicate that the threshold is precisely measured.  
24 
 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
We test the robustness of the main results under various alternative specifications 
and sub-samples. The tests give results generally in line with the main findings reported 
in Tables 3-5, with some caveats.  
We first examine how sensitive the results are to alternative combinations of 
covariates in the control vector. Alternatively excluding INF, INV and OPEN from the 
main specification in equation (6), we find that both the threshold value and the 
qualitative effects around the threshold remain consistent with the primary results (see 
columns 1-3 in Table A4). However, when additional controls are incorporated the results 
vary. Including average years of schooling to control for the level of human capital 
(Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Levine & Renelt, 1992) does not support the existence of a 
threshold as ˆ  = 12, the minimum of the range. This would imply that a strictly linear 
specification of the fiscal variable is more appropriate.  
A number of studies have explored the importance of the quality of institutions in 
the development process (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, & Thaicharoen, 2003; Knack & 
Keefer, 1995). Following on Varoudakis et al. (2007) who suggest that the quality of 
government may be an additional source of nonlinearity in the government size – growth 
relationship, we split the sample in two according to the countries which display high 
levels of effectiveness in government and those that are less effective.
30
 Reestimating the 
threshold regression on either subsample, we find evidence of thresholds at 30 and 33 
percent, respectively. Further, it would appear that the nonlinear effect of government 
                                                 
30
 We determine effectiveness by the Government Effectiveness Indicator (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 
2009) averaged over time for each country and categorized according to values greater or less than zero. 
Values greater than zero indicate more effective governments. This variable has been previously used by 
Gray et al. (2007) and Varoudakis et al. (2007). A full definition is provided in the variables description 
table in Appendix A. 
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spending is more dominant in countries with low government effectiveness. On the other 
hand, highly effective governments seem to be able to offset some of the negative impact 
of large size. These results for a broad sample of countries are in line with Varoudakis et 
al. who find similar effects for the transitional economies. 
The second set of robustness checks explores how sensitive the main findings are 
to diverse subsamples of the data. We divide developing countries into four geographical 
regions (Africa, Latin America, South and East Asia and Europe and Central Asia 
[ECA]).
31
 The estimated threshold values varied between 33 and 41 percent with 
noticeable variations in the coefficients on either side of the threshold (Table A5). 
Notably, for developing countries in Asia and the ECA, government expenditure for 
countries below the threshold had a positive and statistically significant effect. Findings 
from income-based subgroups also showed variations around the threshold consistent 
with the main results (Table A6). 
In addition, we varied the sample on the basis of time to check for possible 
sample selection bias introduced by using an unbalanced panel. As we mentioned, data in 
the earliest years are more prone to missing observations, particularly from the 
developing countries. As a test we exclude observations from the first decade of our 
sample, limiting the estimation sample period to 1981-2005. This reduces the number of 
observations to 447, even though cross-sectionally country coverage is almost unchanged 
(see column 1 of Table A7). Fixed effects estimation of the threshold model suggests 
there may be sample selection bias. While the coefficient on government spending above 
the threshold remains negative and of similar magnitude, the standard errors are larger 
                                                 
31
 Karras (1996) finds that the optimal government size varies across different geographical regions and 
types of countries. 
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causing it to lose statistical significance. Likewise, the coefficient on government 
spending above the threshold is positive, though as in the main analysis, not significant. 
Notably, the coefficients on the control variables remain largely unchanged, except for 
openness, which loses significance. Similar effects are found for further variations in the 
sample period. While sample selection bias may be present in the full panel, the overall 
results prove to be qualitatively robust over various other subsample specifications. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper reexamined the relationship between government spending and long-
run economic growth. In light of prevailing theory, which predicts a nonlinear 
relationship between tax-financed government expenditure and output growth, and in 
view of inconsistent results from various empirical studies on the subject, we sought to 
evaluate the Barro hypothesis by explicitly testing for the existence of thresholds in the 
government size and growth relationship. We applied threshold regression methods 
developed by Hansen (2000) to a panel of 136 developed and developing countries over 
the period 1971-2005. Using a comprehensive measure of government spending, we were 
able to isolate productive elements in various regression specifications. Furthermore, we 
addressed potential simultaneity biases in the government size – growth relationship by 
also using GMM dynamic estimation techniques.  
We find evidence to support a nonlinear effect, but not of the form suggested by 
Barro’s nonlinear hypothesis. For total government spending above a critical threshold, 
we find a weakly significant negative effect on growth. However, this effect is negligible 
for government size below the threshold, and only displays a positive—though not 
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statistically significant—coefficient when productive government spending is 
distinguished from the total. We also find evidence to suggest that the level of economic 
development and the quality of government present additional sources of potential 
nonlinearities. When we analyze developed and developing countries separately, the 
threshold location is lower for developed countries at 26-32 percent. High quality 
governance mitigated some of the negative effects so that nonlinearities were more 
pronounced in countries with less effective governments. Finally, we showed that our 
results were not driven by endogeneity issues and were generally qualitatively robust to 
various specifications and estimation techniques. 
The findings of this paper have significant public policy implications as they offer 
some insight to the policy debate about the optimal size of government, and how this 
varies according to the level of economic development of a country. Indeed, as indicative 
from the sample of 28 developed countries, almost three-quarters of which have a 
government size exceeding 30 percent of GDP as of 2001-2005, the concern about large 
governments is not misplaced. Ever-expanding governments will have negative effects on 
long-run growth in these economies. Fortunately, the evidence also shows that 
improvements to the quality of government can dampen these negative effects. On 
another note, the negligible growth effects of government spending below the threshold 
imply serious offsetting influences between productive and unproductive expenditure, 
which mitigate the potential benefits from increased public spending. This points to a 
necessary restructuring of fiscal budgets towards spending in areas proven to be growth-
enhancing. Creating the ―fiscal space‖ to provide productive capital that will engender 
economic growth should be a critical part of any development agenda. 
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Of course, the optimal composition and financing of government expenditures 
matters. While there has been some work on how these aspects of government spending 
affect its impact on growth, much more work needs to be done in order to arrive at clear, 
more precise policy guidelines. The next chapter addresses these issues. 
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ESSAY 2 
FINANCING PRODUCTIVE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES: 
THE IMPORTANCE OF INITIAL FISCAL CONDITIONS 
 
Introduction 
Endogenous growth theory provides a foundation for the role of productive 
government spending in fostering long-term economic growth. Government provision of 
public capital to the production process contributes to growth directly by adding to the 
existing capital stock, as well as indirectly by raising the marginal productivity of 
privately supplied factors of production (Barro, 1990; Tanzi & Zee, 1997). While what 
exactly constitutes productive government spending in practice is debatable,
32
 there 
seems to be consensus that public investment in basic physical infrastructure such as 
roads, transportation and communication is growth-enhancing. Spending in these areas 
has been shown empirically to have a positive impact on aggregate production and is 
considered crucial for long-term growth and development.
33
 Likewise, a broader concept 
of capital to include both physical and human capital (e.g., Garcia-Mila & McGuire, 
1992; Mera, 1973) has led to studies which demonstrate that public spending to augment 
the stock and quality of human capital, such as public investment in education and 
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 The productivity of public spending may vary according to, inter alia, the potential returns on the 
specific project being funded, how efficiently public funds are used (which may depend on the institutional 
quality of the government), and the extent of the imbalance in the relative shares between public and 
private capital, giving rise to diminishing marginal returns. 
33
 For a general review of the literature see Tanzi and Zee (1997). Early empirical work by Aschauer (1989) 
shows a decisive link between government spending on ―core‖ infrastructure and productivity growth in the 
US economy. Subsequently, Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Canning (1999), Demetriades and Mamuneas 
(2000) also find a positive association between public investment in infrastructure and economic growth.  
Positive output growth effects have also been found by Ramirez (2004, 2009, 2010) for Latin America and 
Chiang, Lo, and Lin (2007) for Asia. 
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healthcare, also has significant growth effects in the long-run.
34
  More recently, it has 
been shown that complementarities between various types of public capital can generate 
additional externalities which increase growth (Agénor & Moreno-Dodson, 2006; Agénor 
& Neanidis, 2006). 
 Given the potential for productive government expenditure to raise long-term 
economic growth rates, it is of major concern that in many countries which undergo fiscal 
adjustments, the first budget items typically slashed are those categories most associated 
with growth.  Latin America has been a particularly extreme case with a history of debt 
defaults and high debt-to-output ratios. In the 1980s and 1990s, the region engaged in a 
wave of fiscal adjustment initiatives aimed at scaling back government activity, 
increasing revenue generation and bringing debt to sustainable levels (Calderòn & 
Servèn, 2004; Easterly, Irwin, & Servèn, 2008). Declines in fiscal deficits seemed to be 
largely driven by cuts in public investment. It is estimated that in the five largest 
economies, infrastructure investment cuts alone contributed at least half of the total fiscal 
adjustments (Calderòn, Easterly, & Servèn, 2003a,b).  
The fallout in productive government expenditure is particularly deleterious in 
developing countries in general because the state plays a more active role in production, 
with public capital representing a much larger share of the aggregate capital stock than in 
                                                 
34
 The empirical evidence for the effect of public investment in education and health is less robust; one 
reason being the difficulty in distinguishing human investment spending from consumption spending 
(Gramlich, 1994). Another reason can be attributed to the gestational lags involved in human capital 
production (Semmler et al., 2007).  Baldacci, Clements, Gupta and Cui (2008), exploring the channels 
linking social spending, human capital and growth, find that both education and health spending have a 
positive effect on education and health capital, and thus support higher growth. Cullison (1993) and 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) find that government spending on education has a positive effect on growth. 
Blankenau et al. (2007) find a positive relationship between public education expenditures and growth for 
developed countries, but not for developing. Pradhan (2010), who examines the role of health spending in 
11 OECD countries, finds that increased health spending is both a cause and a consequence of economic 
growth. 
31 
 
 
industrial countries (Agénor & Montiel, 2008). In Latin America, cuts in public 
infrastructure investment were not fully offset by private sector investment. As a result, 
total infrastructure investment fell, reaching well below the level that would be required 
for sustained growth in the region (Calderòn & Servèn, 2010; Fay & Morrison, 2005). 
Furthermore, with the phenomenally high degree of inequality in Latin America, 
shortfalls in public provision of education and healthcare services would have a 
disproportionate impact on the poor, perpetuating a cycle of low education, low skill and 
low incomes for a significant fraction of the population, thus severely limiting human 
capital accumulation (Agénor, 2004).  
It is then clear that policymakers in developing countries run the risk of stagnating 
their economies over the long run if the appropriate level and composition of public 
investment is not established and maintained. Of course, a major challenge facing 
governments is how to finance such expenditures given binding fiscal constraints. 
Moreover, it has been shown that diverse types of government expenditure may have 
conflicting effects on growth given different sources of financing. Income taxes tend to 
be distortionary creating disincentives to saving and investment, while deficit financing 
may crowd out private investment (Agénor, 2004; Kneller et al., 1999). It is therefore 
important to know how government spending can be most efficiently allocated and 
financed to bring about optimal growth results, particularly in the context of already high 
tax rates, large fiscal deficits, and growing debt stocks.  
This chapter develops a dynamic macroeconomic model for a representative 
closed economy to explore how variations in the composition and financing of 
government expenditures affect economic growth rates in the long run. We use the model 
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to analyze how public investment spending funded by taxes (income or consumption) or 
by borrowing affects long-term output growth. We also examine the effect of varying the 
composition of public expenditure, shifting between consumption and investment 
spending, or re-allocating between different types of public investment. In addition, we 
explore how heterogeneous fiscal conditions affect the implications for growth. 
Specifically, we use alternative parameterizations of the model to simulate extreme initial 
fiscal conditions such as high average tax rates, debt stock ratios and government 
consumption spending.  
The model is calibrated to reflect economic conditions in the seven largest Latin 
American economies during the period 1990 to 2008. The Latin American countries 
provide a suitable testing ground for the implications of the model given their debt 
history and diverse fiscal adjustment experiences. We find that, when tax rates are not 
already high, funding public investment by raising taxes may increase long-run growth. If 
existing tax rates are high, then public investment is only growth-enhancing if funded by 
restructuring the composition of public spending. Interestingly, using debt to finance new 
public investment compromises long-run growth, regardless of the initial fiscal condition.  
The paper contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, we take 
into account that government expenditure is not homogeneous and spending in different 
sectors will have diverse productivities (Feltenstein & Ha, 1995). Thus, we move beyond 
the standard practice of broadly categorizing government spending merely as 
―productive‖ or ―unproductive‖ and explicitly recognize the heterogeneity within 
productive government expenditure itself. To do this, we develop a two-sector 
endogenous growth model in which public investment is divided between physical capital 
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and human capital, allowing for distinct output effects from each type of spending. In this 
way, we are able to draw some policy conclusions about the most appropriate allocation 
of public investment from a growth maximization point of view. Additionally, 
distinguishing between productive sectors allows us to capture complementarities and 
tradeoffs between the various kinds of spending thus contributing to a burgeoning area of 
the literature not yet well explored (Monteiro & Turnovsky, 2008).    
Second, the theoretical model moves away from the balanced government budget 
constraint typical of the literature and opens up the revenue options of the government to 
include deficit financing. This more realistically captures the actual situation of the 
majority of economies today and allows us to explore the extent to which variations in 
the sources of financing affect the relationship between government spending and long-
term growth. To this extent, we are able to explore revenue from taxation (both income 
and consumption), in addition to revenue from debt financing. Surprisingly few studies 
have taken a comprehensive look at how the effect of government spending on growth 
changes with variations in the financing despite the overwhelming theoretical evidence 
(Kellermann, 2007; Turnovsky, 2004).  
Third, we pay particular attention to how these effects change under different 
initial fiscal conditions (such as high tax rates and large debt stocks), an aspect not 
previously explored in the growth literature. The fiscal idiosyncrasies of developing 
countries, in general, and Latin American economies in particular, make this a very 
important issue in determining the extent to which adequate productive government 
spending is even fiscally feasible under tight budgetary constraints. 
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews 
the existing literature on the role of productive public expenditure for economic growth. 
This is followed by the presentation of the theoretical model, which is then calibrated and 
solved in the fourth section. The results from numerical simulations of policy 
experiments are presented in the fifth section and the last section concludes. 
 
Literature Review 
The traditional approach in endogenous growth models to analyzing the 
composition of government spending has been to divide it into two broad categories 
designated as productive and unproductive (Barro, 1990; Turnovsky & Fisher, 1995). 
Productive government expenditures are by definition complementary to the production 
process: raising the marginal productivity of private factors of production and thus 
stimulating growth. Unproductive public expenditures, on the other hand, do not directly 
affect production, but have to be financed from tax revenues, and are a drain on the 
economy.
35
 The obvious conclusion from this categorization is that government spending 
should be allocated away from unproductive and towards productive expenditures. 
However, productive government expenditure is not a homogeneous grouping and 
theories that only distinguish government spending on such a broad basis provide little 
guidance on the issue of allocating among the most growth-enhancing expenditures.  
An early attempt to differentiate between the types of productive public spending 
analytically is provided by Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996), who distinguish 
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 Various empirical studies confirm the negative (positive) growth effects of unproductive (productive) 
government expenditures including Afonso and Gonzalez Alegre (2008), Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1992) and Gupta, Clements, Baldacci, and Mulas-Granados (2005).  
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between government spending on the basis of output elasticities.
36
 The model shows that 
the growth-maximizing allocation of public expenditure is achieved by equating the ratio 
of output elasticities with the ratio of initial spending shares, so that seemingly productive 
expenditures could become unproductive if used in excess. 
 More recent analyses seek to decompose productive government spending 
according to economic sectors. Traditional analytical models of endogenous growth 
simplify the economy to only one productive sector, which does not facilitate the study of 
reallocating among different types of public investment.
37
 Subsequently, the extension to 
multi-sector endogenous growth models has allowed public investment expenditure to be 
differentiated across sectors with diverse output elasticities. Glomm and Ravikumar 
(1997), in a review of the literature on the influence of productive government spending 
on growth, focus on government expenditures that enter as inputs into the production 
function for final output and those that enter as inputs in investment technologies. They 
conclude that government expenditures on infrastructure to enhance physical capital, and 
alternatively on education and health to enhance human capital, have large impacts on 
growth.
38
 Agénor and Neanidis (2006) study the optimal allocation of government 
spending among health, education and infrastructure, taking into account 
complementarities among the three sectors whereby one type of spending affects 
production outcomes in all three sectors. They find that the degree of complementarity 
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 In their model, two types of government spending enter the production function of final output 
differentiated by the size of their output elasticities and their initial shares relative to total government 
spending.  
37
 Examples of traditional one-sector endogenous growth models include Barro (1990), Devarajan et al. 
(1996), Futagami, Morita, and Shibata (1993), Glomm and Ravikumar (1999), Greiner and Hanusch (1998)  
and Turnovsky (2004). 
38
 Various empirical studies support this finding. See, for example, Aschauer (1989), Easterly and Rebelo 
(1993), Blankenau et al. (2007) and Pradham (2010).  Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1992) include human 
capital in their empirical analysis; Mera (1973) includes health. 
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and the parameters characterizing the health and education technologies play a key role. 
Semmler, Greiner, Diallo, Rezai, and Rajaram (2007), who also model productive 
spending in these three areas, conclude that when the model is calibrated for a set of low- 
and middle-income countries, the growth-maximizing allocation of public investment 
directed towards public infrastructure and that which supports the provision of health and 
education is two to one. Bayraktar and Pinto Moreira (2007) disaggregate government 
spending even further, incorporating into the analysis public spending on maintenance 
and security as well as investment in education, health and core infrastructure. They find 
that various policy experiments have differential effects on growth. Monteiro and 
Turnovsky (2008) and Rioja (2005) examine how shifts away from public investment in 
infrastructure towards investment in education affect the long-run growth rate. They find 
such re-allocations to be growth-enhancing. 
 None of the foregoing studies evaluates the growth effect of productive 
government spending according to its source of financing. However, theory suggests that 
the net effect of productive government expenditures will vary depending on how it is 
financed. Barro (1990), Blankenau and Simpson (2004) and Cashin (1995) show that 
when spending is financed by distortionary taxes such as taxes on capital and labor 
income, there is a nonmonotonic effect on long-run growth. At low levels, increases in 
productive public spending will enhance growth as the positive externalities from public 
investment outweigh the negative disincentives from higher tax rates. However, after 
some critical point, the negative growth effects from higher taxes dominate and the net 
effect of public investment on growth becomes negative. Empirical evidence supporting 
the hypothesis that income taxes are detrimental for growth has been provided by 
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Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and King and Rebelo (1990), among others. The 
nonmonotonic hypothesis is hard to test empirically, but some support in its favor has 
been provided by Blankenau et al. (2007), Chen and Lee (2005), Karras (1996, 1997) and 
Sheehey (1993).
39
 
 In terms of using public debt to finance productive expenditures, there are several 
conflicting possibilities emerging from the theoretical literature. Turnovsky (1995) 
proposes that an increase in public investment financed by higher public debt 
unambiguously raises the balanced growth rate. However, the model treats debt as a flow 
rather than a stock, using (negative) lump-sum taxes or transfers as a measure of current 
fiscal imbalance. The analysis, therefore, does not incorporate feedback effects of debt 
servicing. Greiner and Semmler (2000), modeling debt as a stock and accounting for 
feedback effects find that debt-financed public investment can promote economic growth, 
but only under certain conditions. These conditions were subsequently refuted by Minea 
and Villieu (2010) so that it would appear that under the Greiner-Semmler framework, 
debt financing always reduces growth. Futagami, Iwaisako, and Ohdoi (2008), assuming 
that the debt-to-GDP ratio must not exceed a certain threshold, show that borrowing may 
raise or lower growth depending on a high or low steady-state level. A number of studies 
find that using debt may increase growth in the short-run when public capital stock is 
low, but is counterproductive in the long-run (Aizenman, Kletzer, & Pinto, 2007; Glomm 
& Rioja, 2005; Greiner, 2007, 2008; Kellermann et al., 2007; Minea & Villieu, 2009). 
Empirically, Adam and Bevan (2005) find for a set of 45 developing countries that a 
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 The previous chapter in this dissertation also finds support for a weak nonmonotonic relationship 
between government spending and economic growth in a panel of 136 developed and developing countries. 
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large fiscal deficit (as a share of GDP) will retard growth, but for low levels of the deficit 
(less than 1.5 percent), there is no effect on growth.  
An early study which examines similar issues as those raised in this paper is 
Corsetti and Roubini (1996). They analyze optimal spending and financial policies 
(including taxes and debt) in models of endogenous growth where public spending is 
productive. They employ a three-sector endogenous growth model with a human capital 
accumulation sector, a final output sector and home production sector. Public spending 
may be allocated to either human capital accumulation or final output production, but not 
both; thus they do not explore optimal composition issues. A major finding of their 
analysis is that when the set of tax instruments available to the policymaker is sufficiently 
large, public debt is redundant as a policy tool. However, when there are constraints on 
the set of tax instruments available to the policymaker (e.g., when the income from 
human capital and the income from physical capital cannot be taxed separately as in the 
case with income taxes) public debt may be appropriate.  
It has been suggested that the appropriate fiscal strategy to fund productive 
government spending might be expected ―to vary across countries, depending on the 
volume of their revenues, the level and composition of their expenditures, their level of 
indebtedness, their endowments of public capital, their fiscal institutions, and a variety of 
other country-specific factors‖  (Easterly, Irwin, & Servèn, 2007, p.13). While it is 
reasonable to expect that the appropriate strategy to finance productive public spending 
might vary according to a country’s existing fiscal conditions, not much work has been 
done by way of theory or empirical analysis to examine the issue. Bose et al. (2007) 
investigate how the level of economic development in general affects the optimal 
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financing strategy when deciding between taxation and seigniorage. Their theoretical 
analysis suggests that in the presence of capital market imperfection and liquidity shocks, 
the detrimental effect of inflation on growth is stronger at lower levels of economic 
development so that income taxation is relatively less distortionary than seigniorage for 
low-income countries. They provide empirical support in favor of this hypothesis for a 
panel of 61 developed and developing countries observed over the period 1972–1999. In 
the same vein, work by Futagami et al. (2008) suggests that when restricted by a 
budgetary rule which requires a constant level of government debt relative to the size of 
the economy, less developed countries should use bond financing rather than tax 
financing to raise the growth rate, with the converse applying to developed countries. 
Moving away from broad generalizations about the level of development, 
Aizenman et al. (2007) evaluate optimal public investment and fiscal policy for countries 
where distortions and limited enforceability result in limited tax and debt capacities. They 
show how persistent differences in growth rates across countries could stem from 
differential public finance constraints. They conclude that if public spending finances 
investment in the stock of public infrastructure, then relaxation of a debt limit can raise 
welfare by increasing growth rates in transition to the steady state. However, this higher 
debt is associated with lower long-run growth rates. 
 
The Theoretical Model 
We extend the theoretical model developed by Greiner and Semmler (2000) to 
determine how the composition and financing of public expenditure affect long-term 
economic growth. This model is appealing because it moves away from the balanced 
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government budget assumption typical of the fiscal policy and growth literature and 
allows governments to use bond-financing in addition to taxes, as long as long-term debt 
sustainability is maintained. Such a formulation more realistically captures the financing 
practices of the Latin American economies under study. We extend the Greiner-Semmler 
model by distinguishing between different types of public capital, allowing for 
heterogeneity in their output elasticities. This is done within the context of a two-sector 
endogenous growth model in which intermediary human capital and a final market good 
are produced. The government is assumed to supply public capital complementary to the 
production process in either sector. In contrast to previous models that work with 
expenditure flows (Agénor & Yilmaz, 2006; Agénor & Neanidis, 2006), we follow the 
tradition of Futagami et al. (1993), Greiner (2008) and Turnovsky (2004) by developing a 
model with stocks.  All variables are in per capita form and we define public capital as 
non-excludable but subject to congestion. The model is calibrated to represent the seven 
largest economies in Latin America. 
  
Households 
The economy is inhabited by infinitely-lived identical households who supply 
labor, L, inelastically. To simplify the model, we abstract from population growth and 
normalize the number of households to unity. The representative household derives utility 
from private consumption, C(t), and preferences are given by the inter-temporal iso-
elastic utility function 
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where the time argument has been suppressed.
40
   (0,1) denotes the pure rate of time 
preference and  is the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in 
consumption.
41
 Wage income is earned from the share of effective labor used in private 
production, uHL, where 0 < u < 1 is exogenously given and H is the stock of human 
capital per capita. Household income also comes from returns to wealth, W   B + K ,  
which is equal to public debt, B, and private physical capital, K. Income is spent on 
private consumption and new investments in physical capital, K , and government bonds, 
B , where the dot gives the derivative with respect to time. The government levies flat 
rate taxes, K  and L, on income earned from capital and labor, respectively. There is also 
an ad valorem tax, C, on private consumption.  Normalizing labor to one, the 
representative household’s budget identity is thus written as 
  ),)(1()1()1( BrrKwuHKWC BKLKC  
    (11) 
where    (0,1) is the depreciation rate of physical capital, w denotes the real wage 
rate, r is the real return to physical capital and rB is the interest rate on government bonds. 
A no-arbitrage condition requires that the return to physical capital equals the return to 
government bonds yielding rB = r-/(1-).
42
 Thus, the budget identity of the household 
can be re-written as  
.)1()1()1( CWrWwuHW CKKL  

    (11a) 
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 This specification is widely accepted in the literature with variants used by Barro (1990), Bruce and 
Turnovsky (1999) and Corsetti and Roubini (1996). For ease of exposition, we omit the time argument t, 
unless doing so would cause ambiguity. 
41
 For =  1 the utility function is replaced by the logarithmic function CU ln)(  . 
42
 Since both are taxed at rate K, it follows that (1-K) rB = (1-K) r-which implies that  rB = r-/(1-
K). 
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To allow the analysis to be more tractable, we abstract from depreciation (i.e., set K = 0) 
so that the household’s budget constraint is more simply written as 
 
.)1()1()1( CrWwuHW CKL  

     (11b) 
The problem for the representative household is to maximize the discounted stream of 
utility, defined in (10), over an infinite time horizon subject to its budget constraint in 
(11b), taking factor prices as given. The current-value Hamiltonian is 
],)1()1()1[(
1
11
CrWwuH
C
J CKL 







   (12) 
where is the co-state variable for the shadow price of wealth. 
 By dynamic optimization, the necessary optimality conditions are obtained as: 
),1( CC 
 
        (13) 
.)1( rK 

        (14) 
Equation (13) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the individual's tax-adjusted 
shadow value of wealth, while (14) is the standard Keynes-Ramsey consumption rule, 
equating the rate of return on consumption to the after-tax rate of return on capital. If the 
transversality condition limt→∞ e
-tW = 0 holds, which is fulfilled for a time path on 
which assets grow at the same rate as consumption, the necessary conditions are also 
sufficient. 
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Producers  
The economy is assumed to have two sectors, producing two kinds of goods: a 
final private market good and intermediary human capital—a portion of the latter being 
used in the production of the former. While public capital is assumed complementary to 
the production of both goods, we distinguish between the types of public capital that 
enter each stage of the process. To this end, productive government spending is divided 
into investment in core public infrastructure assets (such as transport and 
communications systems, energy, water supply and sanitation)  and public investment to 
enhance education and health services that increase the stock of human capital. As noted 
by Semmler et al. (2007), decomposing the productive capacity of public capital in this 
way more realistically captures the longer gestation lag in creating human capital relative 
to typical physical infrastructure. Even more importantly for the purposes of this paper, 
the decomposition allows us to isolate the effects of different kinds of government 
spending.  
 
Market good. 
Production of market goods, Y, is carried out by many identical firms which can 
be represented by one firm which behaves competitively and which maximizes static 
profits. The production function is given by a Cobb-Douglas technology
43
 
,)()(1  GvKuHAKY
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       (15) 
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 The Cobb-Douglas functional form has been criticized for its restrictiveness. It imposes a unitary 
elasticity of substitution between factors of production which does not hold up in reality. Nevertheless, the 
Cobb-Douglas production function is widely used in theoretical models precisely because of this 
mathematical simplification which makes it more analytically tractable. For a discussion of more flexible 
production forms see Bom, Heijdra and Ligthart (2010), who present the constant elasticity of substitution 
case. 
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where A is a productivity parameter and KG represents the stock of public capital. u,v  
(0,1) represent the respective shares of human capital and public capital used in the 
production of market goods. The remaining portions are used to build human capital and 
thus influence production indirectly. ,  (0,1) denote output elasticities so that 
production displays constant returns to scale in all factors together.
44
 
 
Human capital accumulation. 
Human capital production can be thought of as a non-market, tax-free activity 
(Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti, & Asea, 1997), which uses a Cobb-Douglas technology 
similar to the final market good such that 
,])1[(])1[( 1  GKvHuQH 

      
(16) 
where Q is the productivity parameter and  represents the elasticity of the 
production of human capital with respect to public capital stock in education and health 
facilities. Thus, the technology is again assumed to have constant returns to scale in all 
factors together. Similar representations for human capital formation have been used by 
Agénor and Neanidis (2006), Bayraktar and Pinto Moreira (2007), and Monteiro and 
Turnovsky (2008). The share of public capital stock employed in private production, v, 
can be used as a policy variable to analyze how variations in the allocation of productive 
government spending affect growth.  
Assuming competitive markets, it must hold that the cost of capital, r, and the 
wage rate, w, are equal to their marginal products, respectively. This gives 
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 The constant returns to scale assumption is restrictive but is a necessary condition to obtain a constant 
endogenous growth path in the long run and to ensure the existence of a competitive equilibrium (Minea & 
Villieu, 2009). 
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,)( 1YuHw          (17) 
.)1( 1YKr           (18) 
 
The Government 
 The government in this economy has a range of financing options and is not 
constrained to run a balanced budget in each period. However, it must repay all its debt at 
the end of time, such that ,0))()(1(exp)(lim
0




  
t
K
t
dssrtB  must hold. That is, the 
government is not allowed to run a Ponzi game; discounted debt converges to zero 
asymptotically. The government receives tax revenues from income and consumption 
taxes and can raise additional revenues from issuing government bonds. Note that 
Ricardian equivalence fails due to the presence of distortionary income taxes. 
Government expenditure is split between public consumption, Cp, investment in public 
capital, Ip, and (net) debt servicing, rB.  
The accounting identity describing the accumulation of public debt in continuous 
time is given by: 
,TICrBB pp 

        (19) 
where T denotes total tax revenue such that CrBrKwuHT CKKL   . Public 
consumption
45
 expenditure is assumed not to affect productivity, but has to be financed 
through taxes and constitutes a certain share of tax revenue, Cp = a1T, 0 < a1 < 1. The 
government is allowed to borrow to finance productive expenditures which will yield 
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 Here public consumption refers to social transfers and expenditure with public goods characteristics, 
which do not affect production but may enter into household preferences (such as public parks, civic 
facilities and consumption transfers). 
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returns in the future, but must finance public consumption expenditures and interest 
payments from current tax revenue so that Cp + rB = b1T, 0 < b1 <1. This formulation 
approximates the golden rule of public finance – a fiscal rule that allows the government 
to borrow only for investment but not to fund current spending (Buiter, 2001; Her 
Majesty’s Treasury, 1997).46 The remaining tax share allotted to public investment would 
thus be Ip=b2(1 - b1)T, where b2 > 1 implies debt financing. Variations in the fiscal policy 
parameter b2 allow us to explore the effect of debt financing on growth. Rewriting (19), 
the accumulation of public debt becomes  
),1)(1( 21  bbTB

        (19a) 
where T is as defined above. 
 
Ignoring depreciation, the differential equation describing the evolution of public 
capital may therefore be written as 
.)1( 12 TbbIK pG 

       (20) 
 
 Equilibrium Conditions and the Balanced Growth Path 
Equilibrium conditions. 
 An equilibrium allocation for this economy is defined as a sequence of variables   

0)}(),(),(),(),({ tG tBtKtHtKtC and a sequence of factor prices 

0)}(),({ ttrtw  such that, 
given prices and fiscal parameters, the firm maximizes profits, the household solves (10) 
subject to (11b) and the budget identity of the government (19a) is fulfilled. 
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 The original conceptualization of the golden rule makes a distinction between current and capital 
expenditures. Here, we make the distinction between unproductive and productive expenditures broadly 
defined, so that the latter may include recurrent expenditures that contribute to the stock of human capital, 
such as spending on education and health, and so may be considered productive. 
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 Using (13), (14), (15) and (18), which must hold in equilibrium, equation (13) can 
be rewritten as 
 /1))1((  CC . 
Taking logs of this expression and differentiating with respect to time yields the growth 
rate of consumption 
  ,)()()1)(1(
1


   GK KuHAK
C
C
   (21) 
 
which is equal to the growth rate of the economy, , in steady-state. For the evolution of 
private capital, we combine the definition of B in (19) with the individual consumer’s 
budget constraint given in (11b) to obtain
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Thus, in equilibrium the economy is completely described by (16), (19a), (20), (21) and 
(22) plus the limiting transversality condition of the household. 
 
The balanced growth path.
 
We restrict the analysis to the steady-state where we assume that all the variables 
in the economy grow at their long-run growth rate. For our purposes, we define a 
balanced growth path (BGP) as a path such that the economy is in equilibrium and such 
that consumption, private physical capital, human capital, public capital and government 
debt grow at the same strictly positive constant growth rate; that is, 
,/////  BBKKHHKKCC GG
  0 and is constant. To analyze the model 
around the BGP we define the new variables cC/K, hH/K, gKG/K, bB/K. 
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Differentiating these variables with respect to time leads to a four-dimensional system of 
differential equations given by  
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A solution bghc    with respect to c, h, g, b gives a balanced growth path for the 
model and corresponding ratios c*, h*, g*, b* on the balanced growth path. The high 
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dimension of the dynamic system makes it analytically intractable. We therefore rely on 
numerical simulations to establish the existence and stability of the steady-state 
equilibrium. 
 
Model Calibration and Solution 
The model is calibrated for the seven largest economies in Latin America to 
correspond to average economic performance during 1990-2008. Table 6 gives some 
selected economic data for these countries. Over the study period, the average annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita was 2.3 percent. The average size of government (as 
measured by government spending to GDP) was 20.8 percent. Of this, the greater share 
was spent on public consumption (12.7 percent of GDP), while 5.1 percent of GDP went 
to public investment. The remainder went to debt servicing and other expenses. Public 
spending was financed by revenue from taxation and other sources, as well as debt. On 
average, total revenue was about 21.3 percent of GDP, with tax revenue constituting the 
largest share.
47
 The average stock of debt per country was 34.6 percent of GDP with 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru having debt stocks above the average. The benchmark 
parameters of the model are chosen to reflect these statistics. 
Table 7 presents the values of parameters used in the benchmark model 
representing the average data for the region (―Region Average‖).  The rate of time 
preference, , is set at 0.04 which is in line with conventions in the literature (Bayraktar 
& Pinto Moreira, 2007; Rioja, 2005). This leads to a discount factor of approximately 
0.96. We set the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, , to 2. This value 
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 Other sources of revenue include royalties from natural resource extraction which vary across countries 
according to the level of production in the mineral sector and the extent to which tax incentives are used to 
attract foreign investors (OECD, 2008). 
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is lower than what is typically used for industrial country studies and is consistent with 
evidence indicating that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution tends to be low at low 
levels of income (Bayraktar & Pinto Moreira, 2007). The share of human capital 
employed in private production is set to 0.9, which is the average between values used by 
Bayraktar and Pinto Moreira (2007) for Haiti and Semmler et al. (2007) for a set of 
middle- and low-income countries.  
We set the elasticity of output with respect to public capital in infrastructure, , to 
0.15. This is close to the 0.138 estimated by Calderòn and Servèn (2003) for the elasticity 
of GDP to infrastructure for a group of countries in Latin America, as well as to the 0.147 
estimate used by Suescun (2005) for Colombia. The value for the elasticity of output with 
respect to human capital, , is put at 0.3 which is the average of the estimates used by 
Bayraktar and Pinto Moreira (2007), Rioja (2005) and Semmler et al. (2007). The 
constant returns to scale technology used in the model, thus, implies that the output 
elasticity of private capital is 0.55. This is larger than the 0.33 typically found in OECD 
countries, but close to the value of 0.60 estimated by Elias (1992) for the group of Latin 
American countries under study.  
For the production of human capital, the elasticity of public capital stock in 
education and health, , is set at 0.30. This value is larger than the 0.10 used by Rioja 
(2005) and the econometric estimate obtained by Blankenau et al. (2007) for the elasticity 
of the public capital stock in education only. Since the model combines public capital in 
both education and health for human capital production, we use a higher value to take 
51 
 
 
into account externalities from complementarities between the two forms of spending.
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Our estimate is close to that used by Semmler et al. (2007).  
Since a fraction of public capital is used to produce human capital – itself an input 
factor in private market production – the final output elasticity of total public capital is 
derived from the model as  +  Given the selected parameters, the size of the output 
elasticity of total public capital is thus 0.24. This value is consistent with the 0.268 
estimated by Bom and Ligthart (2009) in a meta-analysis on the output elasticity of 
public capital for a sample of 67 studies. The remaining parameters—the shift factors and 
fiscal policy variables—are fixed as to achieve a baseline growth rate consistent with the 
data for the seven Latin American countries of interest. 
The calibrated model provides a fair representation of the average Latin American 
country, as defined by the data. The steady-state results of the numerical simulation are 
presented in Table 8.We use these results as the benchmark for various fiscal policy 
experiments.  
 
Policy Experiments  
 As a starting point, we first simulate the long-run growth effects for the region as 
a result of the fiscal adjustment policies enacted in the 1990s. As previously discussed, 
Latin American countries attempted to cut their fiscal deficits by reducing expenditure on 
public infrastructure—to as little as one percent of GDP in some countries. We use the 
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 Agénor and Neanidis (2006) provide several examples of the interaction between health and education to 
improve the quality of human capital. Healthier students are more likely to participate and do better in 
school. Among the examples cited, Baldacci et al. (2008) show that health capital has a statistically 
significant effect on school enrollment rates. Simultaneously, the evidence shows that higher education 
levels can improve health. Smith and Haddad (2000) report that improvements in female secondary school 
enrollment rates during 1970-1995 accounted for 43 percent of the total reduction in the child underweight 
rate of developing countries. 
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model to analyze the long-term effects of this policy by simulating a reduction in the 
deficit brought about by a cut in public investment from 4.6 percent of GDP (the 
benchmark) to one percent. The effect is to successfully lower the debt stock to 10.7 
percent of GDP, but at the cost of dramatically reducing the growth rate to 0.6 percent in 
the steady-state. The model results thus underscore the concern that growth is potentially 
stagnated in the long run when fiscal adjustment policies disproportionately target public 
investment spending. 
Given the importance of public investment to growth, we next use numerical 
simulations to explore how variations in the composition and financing of public 
investment expenditure affect the steady-state growth rate. We conduct four types of 
fiscal policy experiments: (a) increase public investment financed by new debt issues, (b) 
increase public investment financed by raising taxes (income or consumption), (c) 
increase public investment by re-allocating spending away from public consumption, and 
(d) re-allocating public investment in infrastructure toward education and healthcare. We 
first examine the case for the average Latin American country and then examine how the 
growth effects vary when initial fiscal conditions are more extreme. Three scenarios are 
investigated: (a) when both the existing debt ratio and tax rates are high (―High Debt, 
High Tax‖ scenario); (b) when the debt ratio and tax rates are low (―Low Debt, Low Tax‖ 
scenario); and (c) when the debt ratio is high, but tax rates are low (―High Debt, Low 
Tax‖ scenario).49 
 
                                                 
49
 A fourth possible case ―Low Debt, High Tax‖ might also be of interest. However, simulating this 
scenario in the current model involves altering more than just the relevant policy variables; significant 
adjustments to the baseline parameters are also required. Such changes would substantially alter the 
underlying structure of the original simulated economy, limiting our ability to make cross-scenario 
comparisons. Therefore, only the first three scenarios are considered. 
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The Region Average  
Financing increased public investment by issuing new debt. 
Financing public investment through increased borrowing is detrimental to 
growth (see top panel of Table 9). When b2 is increased from 2 to 2.5, the steady-state 
growth rate falls from 2.50 percent in the benchmark case to 2.36 percent. The policy 
causes debt to increase from 36.7 to 41 percent, which is similar to going from a debt 
level as in Argentina to a debt level as in Brazil. The new borrowing has two effects: (a) 
It increases the debt stock ratio, which then translates into higher debt repayments; and 
(b) It also raises interest rates (the marginal cost of borrowing) so that repayments are 
even larger. The higher debt-servicing costs eventually crowd out spending on public 
investment so that instead of increasing, the ratio of public investment to GDP actually 
falls from 4.59 to 4.17 percent in the steady state. The elevated interest rate will also 
discourage private investment causing an additional crowding-out effect. 
The model shows that for countries already using deficit financing, and which 
have average debt stock ratios around 35 percent of GDP, such as Argentina, it is better 
to reduce the amount of deficit-financing being used. Reducing b2 slightly to 1.9 (i.e., 
lowering the debt stock by about one percent of GDP) is shown to increase the growth 
rate by 0.04 percentage points. In this case, the share of public investment now actually 
increases by 0.12 percentage points to 4.71 percent of GDP, since debt repayments are 
reduced and more money is made available for investment. The implication is that the 
existing debt burden in Latin America may already be too high so that financing 
additional public investment by further increasing the debt stock is counterproductive.  
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Financing increased public investment by raising taxes. 
Increasing tax rate on capital and labor income. 
Public investment financed by higher income taxes raises the steady-state growth 
rate (see middle panel of Table 9). The higher income tax rates increase the amount of tax 
revenue generated and thus enlarge the potential pool of funds available for public 
expenditure. A one-percentage-point change from 15 to 16 percent in the tax rate causes a 
corresponding rise in tax revenue to GDP (23.54 to 24.41percent). This in turn increases 
public investment spending to 4.72 percent of GDP, which raises the public capital stock 
and subsequently the growth rate by 0.02 percentage points to 2.52 percent. Similar 
growth effects are experienced if the income tax rate is further increased to 17 percent. 
However, for any higher increases the model becomes unsolvable. This may be an 
indication that the extent to which the tax rate can be used to finance higher expenditure 
is limited and is consistent with endogenous growth theories which predict a 
nonmonotonic relationship between growth and the tax rate (Barro, 1990; Blankenau and 
Simpson, 2004).
50
 Conversely, reducing the income tax rate reduces available funds for 
public investment and reduces the growth rate. 
 
Increasing tax rate on consumption taxes. 
We alternatively try to achieve an increase in tax revenue using the consumption 
rather than the income tax (see middle panel of Table 9). Raising the consumption tax 
rate from 20 to 21 percent increases the tax revenue relative to GDP to 23.96 percent, 
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 It must be noted that the tax increase is not exclusively spent on public investment; it is spread across 
consumption spending and debt repayment as well. This has to do with how the model is formulated, 
making public consumption spending and debt repayments positive linear functions of tax revenue. In 
practical terms, this can be interpreted as representing fungibility in the use of public funds (Erekson, 
DeShano, Platt, & Ziegert, 2002; Lago-Penas, 2006). 
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stimulating an increase in public investment spending to 4.67 percent and raising the 
growth rate to 2.53 percent. It is interesting to note that a one-percentage-point increase 
in the consumption tax rate generated slightly less revenue (relative to GDP) than a 
similar increase in the income tax rate, but had a greater effect on growth. This may be 
due to the less distortionary impact of consumption taxes on investment and saving 
decisions relative to the capital income tax, which reduces the net rate of return to private 
capital and thus causes disincentives to investment. Therefore, if the choice is between an 
increase in the income or the consumption tax, the preference with respect to growth 
should fall on the consumption tax.
51
 Again, it must be noted that taxes cannot be raised 
indefinitely and for values higher than C = 0.22 the model fails to arrive at a steady-state 
solution. 
It must be stressed that the tax rates used in the simulations are chosen so as to 
replicate the average tax revenue as a share of GDP, and do not reflect actual tax rates in 
the Latin American economies. Marginal tax rates in these countries are, in fact, higher 
with top marginal rates for corporate and individual income taxes ranging between 35 
and 40 percent. Tax theory tells us that the efficiency loss from a tax increases 
exponentially with the tax rate. Therefore, we may expect smaller improvements in the 
equilibrium growth rate if higher marginal tax rates are actually taken into account. 
Further, the model abstracts from several things, including tax evasion. Our 
simplified representation assumes that increases in the tax rate translate fully into 
corresponding increases in tax revenue. However, the tax literature shows that as the 
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 There may be other factors to take into consideration such as the higher burden a consumption tax places 
on the poor (Vasquez, 1987). Nevertheless, because of high informality and difficulty in capturing the tax 
base, consumption taxes are used more predominantly in developing countries, including Latin America 
(Bird & Gendron, 2007). 
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marginal rate increases, we might expect to see greater incidence of tax evasion (Alm, 
1999), so that later tax increases may not be as effective in generating additional revenue. 
This possibility weakens the case for funding additional public investment through 
raising tax rates. 
Restructuring public spending. 
Re-allocating spending from public consumption to investment. 
 Shifting expenditure away from public consumption toward public investment 
increases the steady-state growth rate (see bottom panel of Table 9). This finding is 
consistent with the consensus in the growth literature. However, doing quantitative 
analysis in a fully specified general equilibrium macroeconomic model allows us to 
determine just how potentially stimulating even a slight restructuring of public 
expenditure can be. Lowering public consumption to GDP by about one percentage point 
(from 14.12 in the baseline scenario to 13.05; achieved by reducing a1 to 0.55) increases 
public investment to 5.23 percent of GDP and increases the growth rate to 2.7 percent. 
Re-allocating an additional percent (lowering a1 to 0.50) further increases the growth rate 
to 2.89 percent. 
 While it is obvious that a restructuring of public spending away from 
unproductive toward productive expenditure is growth-enhancing, such a policy may be 
politically difficult to implement. This is particularly true for Latin American countries 
where there has been a long history of populist governments (Conniff, 1999; Ronchi, 
2007). This phenomenon would help explain why capital rather than current expenditures 
were disproportionately cut during the fiscal adjustment episodes. Given the difficult 
57 
 
 
political challenge to cut consumption expenditures, it is necessary to explore alternative 
shifts in spending which may be more politically feasible.  
 
Re-allocating between infrastructure and human capital spending. 
One advantage of the model is that it allows for heterogeneity among different 
forms of productive public expenditure. Shifting the emphasis of public investment away 
from infrastructure and towards public capital which more specifically supports human 
capital formation is growth-enhancing. Changing the allocation by just five percentage 
points (v = 0.85) increases the steady-state growth rate from 2.5 to 2.9 percent, the most 
significant increase of all the policy experiments. The higher growth rate comes about 
through the following channel: more spending in the human capital sector raises the ratio 
of human capital to private capital, h*, from 0.123 in the benchmark case to 0.149. 
Human capital, being the limiting factor, has a higher marginal productivity so that any 
given increase generates more output than a similar increase in physical capital and thus 
stimulates the growth rate more. Further shifts in public investment spending (v = 0.8) 
that bring the human/private capital ratio to 0.171 cause the growth rate to increase to 
3.19 percent.  
We note that these results may be dependent on the specific parameter values 
assigned to the output elasticities for public capital spent on human capital accumulation 
and private market output, respectively. Robustness checks are therefore carried out with 
alternative parameters (within the purview of the literature) to see how results vary. 
Simulations, reported in Appendix B, show that the effects on growth are not 
qualitatively different. Our findings are consistent with Rioja (2005) who explores similar 
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shifts between infrastructure and education spending for the same group of countries; and 
Montiero and Turnovsky (2008) who calibrate a similar model for the United States. Re-
allocating spending to the most productive uses will generate the best returns on public 
investment and give the strongest boost to growth. Productivity of the factor in relatively 
short supply is higher and public capital to boost this factor will have greater returns. 
 
Fiscal Strategy under Different Initial Fiscal Conditions 
“High Debt, High Tax” scenario. 
Of the seven Latin American countries under study, the ―High Debt, High Tax‖ 
scenario (henceforth abbreviated to HDHT) might represent Chile which has tax and debt 
ratios above average. The steady-state results for the HDHT scenario are presented in 
Table 10. The new benchmark from which policy experiments are simulated is achieved 
by increasing the tax and debt parameters as indicated at the bottom of the table. In the 
HDHT baseline solution (presented in bold type), tax revenue to GDP is approximately 
30 percent and the debt stock ratio is about 51 percent. The corresponding growth rate is 
2.44 percent, which is lower than in the scenario representing the region average.  
When the fiscal policy experiments are simulated, the results show that financing 
increased public investment by issuing new debt reduces growth, which is the same effect 
as in the average case. Increasing b2 raises the debt ratio, lowers public investment to 
GDP and eventually lowers the steady-state growth rate.  
Using higher income taxes to fund public investment clearly demonstrates a 
nonmonotonic relationship between the tax rate and growth in the HDHT case. Initially 
raising the income tax rate from 20 to 22 percent, and then 24 percent, increases public 
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investment and stimulates a rise in the growth rate from 2.44 to 2.5 percent. However, 
further increasing the income tax rate beyond 24 percent has a deleterious effect on 
growth, which starts to fall even as the share of public investment to GDP continues to 
rise. The HDHT scenario clearly demonstrates the nonmonotonic growth effect when 
public spending is financed by distortionary taxes. This implies that when initial tax rates 
are already high, there is little room for further income tax rate increases to support the 
budget. Increasing the consumption tax rate instead of the income tax rate shows no 
evidence of a nonmonotonic effect, but rather consistently increases growth. 
Interestingly, in the HDHT case it is possible to raise consumption tax rates over a 
considerable range (C goes up to 33 percent) before a steady-state solution does not 
exist.  
The remaining policy experiments have qualitatively similar growth effects as in 
the region average case. Shifting spending from public consumption to investment is 
growth-enhancing, while re-allocating from public investment in infrastructure toward 
education and health also stimulates higher growth. Changing the allocation to 
infrastructure by just five percentage points (v = 0.85) increases the steady-state growth 
rate from 2.44 to 2.84 percent.  
 
“Low Debt, Low Tax” scenario. 
In the ―Low Debt, Low Tax‖ (LDLT) scenario, funding public investment by 
raising either income or consumption taxes has the potential for considerable 
improvement to growth. The steady-state results are shown in Table 11. The respective 
benchmark tax and debt-to-GDP ratios are 17.8 and 29.86 percent, respectively, which 
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roughly approximates the fiscal situation in Mexico during the study period. The results 
demonstrate that when tax rates are initially low, there is room for substantial increases 
before the negative financing effects outweigh the positive impact of public investment. 
In the simulations, increasing income tax rates from 11 to 22 percent results in 
consistently higher growth rates.  
The qualitative growth effects from the other policy experiments are similar to the 
region average. Despite a lower initial debt ratio, issuing public debt to fund public 
investment is harmful to growth, with the growth rate declining to 2.02 percent when debt 
is raised from 30 to 35 percent (achieved by increasing b2 from 2 to 2.8). On the other 
hand, re-allocating public expenditure away from consumption and emphasizing 
investment in education and healthcare bring the greatest improvements to the growth 
rate. 
 
“High Debt, Low Tax” scenario. 
The previous results carry over to the ―High Debt, Low Tax‖ (HDLT) scenario, 
which is roughly representative of the Peruvian economy during 1990-2008. Table 12 
provides the steady-state results in which the benchmark tax and debt ratios are 18.36 and 
46.32 percent, respectively.
52
 It is interesting to note that in this extreme scenario where 
such a large debt burden is underpinned by low tax revenue, a steady-state equilibrium 
which supports additional borrowing (i.e. increasing b2 beyond 2.95) does not exist. In 
this extreme case, debt financing public investment is not an option if the economy is to 
reach equilibrium in the long run. On the other hand, reducing the usage of debt 
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 It must be noted that in order to simulate this scenario, the share of tax revenue allocated to public 
consumption expenditure, a1, also had to be adjusted. 
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considerably improves the growth rate, which rises to 2.6 percent when the debt level is 
lowered from 46 to 44 percent. The growth effects of the remaining policy experiments 
are qualitatively similar to the region average and do not need to be discussed further. 
To summarize, regardless of the initial fiscal condition, for the Latin American 
economies under consideration, financing additional public investment by debt will 
compromise growth in the long run. Where tax rates are not already high, funding public 
investment by raising taxes, in particular consumption taxes, may be a viable option to 
support long-run growth. If, however, tax rates are already high or other constraints to 
raising tax revenue exist, then public investment should be funded by restructuring the 
composition of public spending. This may be accomplished by lowering the share of 
public consumption expenditure in favor of investment in public capital. In addition, even 
greater growth benefits can be achieved when public investment is carefully allocated to 
those sectors where its marginal productivity is largest. In our simplified model, re-
allocating public investment from the final output sector toward intermediary human 
capital production enhances long-run growth. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we develop a dynamic micro-founded macroeconomic model to 
explore how variations in the composition and financing of government expenditures 
affect economic growth in the long run. The model is used to analyze how public 
investment spending funded by taxes or borrowing affects long-term output growth. We 
also examine the effect of varying the composition of public expenditure, shifting 
between consumption and investment spending, or re-allocating between different types 
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of public investment. In addition, we use alternative parameterizations of the model to 
explore how the effects on growth change under extreme initial fiscal conditions such as 
high average tax rates and debt ratios. The model is calibrated to reflect economic 
conditions in the seven largest Latin American economies during the period 1990 to 
2008. 
 With respect to financing productive government expenditures, the simulation 
results show that when the choice is between taxes and borrowing, the better fiscal 
strategy is to raise taxes. For the Latin American economies under consideration, which 
already have sizeable debt ratios, issuing new debt earmarked even for productive 
expenditures which have expected future returns is harmful to long-run growth. This 
finding is consistent with several other studies which do not advocate deficit-financing as 
an effective fiscal strategy to fund public spending and still achieve long-term growth. 
The negative growth impact of debt-financed public investment is robust to different 
initial fiscal conditions, that is, whether the economy in question has a high or low 
existing debt stock. In either circumstance, borrowing to finance public investment not 
only raises the debt stock, but also increases domestic interest rates, thereby raising debt 
servicing and crowding out domestic private investment. The simulations show that in the 
steady-state, financing public investment by new debt issues actually leads to less public 
investment in the long run and a lower level of public capital stock because a larger share 
of public spending is redirected to future debt servicing. 
 On the other hand, productive government expenditures financed by raising taxes 
can increase the long-run growth rate as long as the optimal tax level has not been 
exceeded. The simulations show results consistent with the nonmonotonic effect of tax-
63 
 
 
financed government spending. For the ―Region Average‖ and ―Low Tax‖ scenarios, 
increasing tax rates stimulated growth, with increases in the nondistortionary 
consumption tax rate having a greater positive effect than increases in the tax on capital 
and labor income. For the ―High Debt, High Tax‖ scenario, raising taxes was only 
stimulative to a point, after which further increases caused the growth rate to fall. This 
implies that for countries where the level of taxation is already high (e.g., Chile and 
Colombia), tax increases are not a good option for funding public investment. In this case 
the distortionary effect of higher taxes totally offsets any productivity gains from higher 
public capital in the production process. 
 The analysis also underscores previous work which shows that public 
consumption expenditure has a negative effect on growth so that reallocating away from 
consumption towards public investment can have tremendous positive growth effects in 
the long run. In the model, such reallocations bring about some of the most significant 
increases in the growth rate in all scenarios. More important, the model formulation 
allows us to take the analysis a little further to show that reallocations amongst public 
investment itself toward the most productive sectors can have sizeable growth effects. By 
allowing for heterogeneity within government spending on two levels, the model shows 
that not only reallocation away from consumption to productive expenditure is viable, but 
also shifting among various types of public investment projects. In the simulations, 
shifting spending from investment in infrastructure to investment in education and health 
facilities to promote human capital accumulation enhanced long-run growth.  
This result has tremendous implications for countries facing binding fiscal 
constraints and which find it politically infeasible to significantly cut public consumption 
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expenditure. More careful selection of the most rewarding public projects can raise public 
capital across multiple sectors, stir private and human capital accumulation and promote 
growth. Moreover, this strategy is viable regardless of the initial fiscal conditions, as 
growth was stimulated in every scenario. The challenge now is to determine those types 
of public investment with the highest future returns. To this end, there is a pressing need 
for more accurate estimates of production elasticities for public capital used in various 
sectors in order to refine future dynamic models. 
Other interesting areas for future work would be to extend the current model to a 
(small) open economy which can borrow from abroad at world interest rate (plus a 
country premium). Less crowding-out effects from reduced domestic borrowing may 
allow for positive growth effects of specific debt-financed public investment (Glomm & 
Rioja, 2005). Another potentially worthwhile extension would be to account for the 
possibility of tax evasion which prevents increases in tax rates from translating into 
commensurate increases in tax revenue, thus limiting the effectiveness of tax policy to 
fund public investment. 
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CONCLUSION 
This dissertation reexamined the role of fiscal policy in promoting long-run 
economic growth. Specifically, we focused on the impact of government expenditures 
and showed that the relationship is not only dependent on the level of expenditures, but 
also on its structure and financing. The interplay of these and other factors is instructive. 
The size of government does not seem to matter until it passes some critical threshold. 
The location of this threshold is itself dependent on various factors, the level of economic 
development and composition of financing being two salient ones. Moreover, the analysis 
shows that the growth effect of government spending targeted towards seemingly 
productive sectors is not necessarily positive, but varies with the overall structure of total 
public expenditure, the method of funding, the effectiveness of government and the 
existing fiscal conditions. The interaction of all these factors, plus other relevant but 
unobservable ones, may be such that the overall effect of government spending is offset 
and not easily discerned in empirical analyses.  
The findings of this study have significant public policy implications as they offer 
some insight to the policy debate about the optimal size of government. Indeed, the 
concern about large governments is not misplaced as several countries have exceeded the 
critical threshold identified in this study. Further expansion of government will have 
negative effects on long-run growth in these economies. Fortunately, the evidence also 
shows that improvements to the quality of government can dampen these negative 
effects. On another note, the negligible growth effects of government spending below the 
threshold imply serious offsetting influences, which mitigate the potential benefits from 
increased public spending.  
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This complex interplay of factors led us to develop a more comprehensive two-
sector endogenous growth model capable of explaining how various fiscal strategies 
influence the growth outcome for a country in the long run. We find that, where tax rates 
are not already high, funding public investment by raising taxes may increase long-run 
growth. If existing tax rates are high, then public investment is only growth-enhancing if 
funded by restructuring the composition of public spending. Interestingly, using debt to 
finance new public investment compromises growth, regardless of the initial fiscal 
condition. 
Future work in this area will rely on accurate estimates of relevant parameters, 
such as the production elasticities of public capital, to calibrate more sophisticated 
dynamic models. Furthermore, the extension of the current closed economy model to an 
open economy which can access external debt at world interest rate is potentially 
interesting. Another worthwhile extension would be to account for the possibility of tax 
evasion which prevents increases in tax rates from translating into commensurate 
increases in tax revenue. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1       
Descriptive Statistics, 1971-2005       
Variable Mnemonic Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
       
Annual average growth in GDP per capita GROWTH 2.1 3.3 -16.8 15.1 557 
Total central government expenditure as % of GDP GOV 28.1 10.8 7.2 79.4 557 
Productive central government expenditure as % GDP PR_GOV 8.0 3.9 0.1 23.0 394 
Log initial GDP per capita (constant 2000 $US) LINI_GDP 7.9 1.5 4.4 10.8 557 
Inflation rate (%) INF 40.7 310 -1.6 6517 557 
Investment as % of GDP INV 22.0 6.7 5.5 60.9 557 
Exports + Imports as % of GDP OPEN 77.4 43.8 9.9 405 557 
Average years of schooling SCH 5.7 2.8 0.0 12.2 438 
Government effectiveness indicator GOV_EFF 34.8 101 -178 229 557 
          
Variable Correlations          
  GROWTH GOV PR_GOV LINI_GDP INF INV OPEN SCH GOV_EFF 
          
GROWTH 1.000         
GOV -0.048 1.000        
PR_GOV 0.008 0.621 1.000       
LINI_GDP 0.074 0.703 0.482 1.000      
INF -0.072 -0.296 -0.070 -0.138 1.000     
INV -0.024 0.320 0.132 0.343 0.224 1.000    
OPEN -0.108 0.053 -0.108 -0.042 -0.144 -0.041 1.000   
SCH 0.364 0.152 0.275 0.212 -0.007 0.001 -0.078 1.000  
GOV_EFF 0.115 0.356 0.565 0.229 0.094 0.154 -0.151 0.241 1.000 
Note. The table gives descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regressions.
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Table 2 
Threshold Identification and Inference 
Sample 
Threshold estimate 
ˆ  LR0 p-value 
    
All countries 33 5.528 0.015 
Developed countries 26 3.647 0.000 
Developing countries 33 11.603 0.005 
Note. p-values determined from 200 bootstrap repetitions for full sample and developing countries;  
50 bootstrap repetitions for developed countries. 
 
Table 3      
Baseline Regression Results (Total Government Spending) 
Estimation technique: 5-year averages, two-way FE 
Dependent variable: Real GDP p.c. growth  
 Full sample 
Developed 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Variable Linear Quadratic =33 =26 =33 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
GOV -0.066 -0.059    
 (0.018) (0.463)    
GOV
2
  -0.000    
  (0.910)    
GOV*I(GOV≤)   -0.009 -0.012 -0.001 
   (0.788) (0.748) (0.986) 
GOV*I(GOV>)   -0.045 -0.059 -0.072 
   (0.095) (0.067) (0.058) 
LINI_GDP -7.452 -7.459 -7.538 -5.519 -9.049 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
INF -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.076) (0.816) (0.119) 
INV 0.198 0.198 0.201 0.160 0.283 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.049) (0.000) 
OPEN 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.035 0.030 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.034) (0.030) (0.063) 
Constant 54.56 54.51 54.06 49.28 58.63 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
      
Observations 557 557 557 158 399 
Number of countries 136 136 136 28 108 
R-squared 0.390 0.390 0.398 0.549 0.466 
Wald test 1=2 (p-value)   0.053 0.012 0.004 
Note. Robust p-values in parentheses. Time dummies included but not reported. Constant term 
represents the average value of the fixed effects.  
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Table 4     
GMM Estimation to Address Endogeneity  
Estimation method: One-step system GMM  
Dependent variable: Real GDP p.c. growth  
 Full sample 
Developing 
countries 
Variable Linear Quadratic =33 =33 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
GOV -0.135 -0.264   
 (0.022) (0.112)   
GOV
2
  0.002   
  (0.394)   
GOV*I(GOV≤)   0.007 -0.029 
   (0.924) (0.693) 
GOV*I(GOV>)   -0.061 -0.108 
   (0.245) (0.070) 
LINI_GDP -3.470 -3.430 -3.482 -2.806 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INF -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.090) (0.094) (0.099) (0.079) 
INV 0.263 0.264 0.26 0.288 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OPEN -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 -0.017 
 (0.095) (0.081) (0.067) (0.136) 
Lower middle income 7.718 7.872 8.059 6.124 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
Upper middle income 15.18 15.38 15.14 12.62 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High income 21.25 21.35 21.16 18.59 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 15.27 16.68 12.29 11.21 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.004) (0.007) 
     
Observations 557 557 557 396 
Number of countries 136 136 136 107 
Wald test 1=2 (p-value)   0.074 0.024 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.135 0.117 0.231 0.171 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.248 0.236 0.413 0.635 
Number of instruments 108 108 120 107 
Note. Robust p-values in parentheses.  Time dummies included but not reported.  Time and 
income class dummies entered as exogenous; LINI_GDP entered as predetermined; all other 
variables entered as endogenous with maximum lags 4. 
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Table 5 
    Productive Government Spending (Linear and Non-linear) 
Estimation methods: Two-way FE and GMM 
 Dependent variable: Real GDP p.c. growth   
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     PR_GOV -0.194 
 
-0.265 
 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.052) 
 PR_GOVI(GOV≤33) 0.022 
 
0.001 
  
(0.850) 
 
(0.996) 
PR_GOVI(GOV>33) -0.161 
 
-0.233 
  
(0.074) 
 
(0.072) 
LINI_GDP -8.014 -8.198 -2.863 -2.793 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.009) 
INF -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
 
(0.521) (0.513) (0.202) (0.243) 
INV 0.208 0.214 0.316 0.336 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OPEN 0.018 0.017 -0.027 -0.0361 
 
(0.327) (0.327) (0.118) (0.078) 
Lower middle income 
  
6.848 6.950 
   
(0.016) (0.014) 
Upper middle income 
  
14.35 13.26 
   
(0.004) (0.006) 
High income 
 
17.46 18.06 
   
(0.003) (0.002) 
Constant 59.80 59.93 9.773 7.991 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.132) (0.177) 
     Observations 394 394 394 394 
Number of countries 103 103 103 103 
R-squared 0.394 0.42 
  Wald test 1=2 (p-value) 0.004 
 
0.017 
Number of instruments 
 
101 93 
AR(2) test (p-value) 
 
0.377 0.601 
Hansen test (p-value)     0.281 0.417 
Note. Robust p-values in parentheses. Time dummies included but not reported. Columns (3)-(4) estimated by 
GMM. Time and income-class dummies entered as exogenous; LINI_GDP entered as predetermined; all other 
variables entered as endogenous using all available lags. 
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Table 6  
 Selected Economic Indicators 1990-2008 
 Economic indicator Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Venezuela Average 
Revenue (% GDP) 
a
 20.0 21.3 24.4 29.3 16.0 15.1 23.2 21.3 
Tax revenue (% GDP) 
a
  14.3 16.7 17.8 13.1 11.1 13.2 13.1 14.2 
Government expenditure (% GDP) 
a
 19.0 15.6 18.9 30.6 22.8 14.4 24.7 20.8 
Government consumption (% GDP) 
b
 11.2 19.5 11.2 16.3 10.6 9.5 10.8 12.7 
Public investment (% GDP) 
c
 1.7 4.5 4.9 7.2 3.6 3.8 9.9 5.1 
Public debt (% GDP)
 a
 36.2 41.8 38.7 27.5 24.4 42.4 31.1 34.6 
GDP p.c. growth (%) 
b
 3.0 1.2 3.9 1.8 1.7 2.7 1.5 2.3 
Private consumption (% GDP)
 b
 68.1 61.9 61.7 66.2 67.8 70.6 58.3 64.9 
Domestic investment (% GDP)
 b
 18.2 18.0 23.6 20.2 23.4 20.6 21.9 20.8 
Trade (% GDP) 
b
 28.0 21.4 64.5 35.7 52.8 35.5 52.3 41.5 
Capital-output ratio 
d
  1.9 1.9 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.1 2.1 
GDP p.c. (2000 US$)
 b
 7580 3717 4735 2483 5654 2082 5037 4470 
GDP p.c. PPP (2005 intl $)
 b
 10128 7954 10163 6757 11500 5600 9998 8871 
a
 Official statistics from public sector agencies in each country. 
b
 Data sourced from World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
c
 Public investment in infrastructure 2001-2006 from Calderòn and Servèn (2010). 
d Author’s calculations. 
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Table 7  
Benchmark Parameters for Region Average 
Parameter Value Definition 
   
 0.04 Rate of time preference 
 2.00 Inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption 
u 0.90 Share of human capital  employed in private production 
 0.30 Elasticity of output, Y, w.r.t. educated labor (human capital) 
 0.15 Elasticity of output, Y, w.r.t. public capital in infrastructure 
 0.30 Elasticity of the production of human capital w.r.t. public capital stock in 
education and health 
A 0.85 Shift factor in final market production 
Q 0.50 Shift factor in human capital production 
 
Fiscal Policy Variables 
K 0.15 Tax rate on capital income 
L 0.15 Tax rate on labor income 
C 0.20 Tax rate on consumption 
v 0.90 Share of public capital stock employed in private production (public 
infrastructure) 
a1 0.60 Share of total tax revenue used to finance public consumption 
b2 2.00 Extent to which new bond issues are used to finance public investment. 
b2 >1 implies the use of debt financing. 
 
 
Table 8 
Benchmark Solution for Model Calibrated to Region Average 
Economic indicator LAC-7 average Model 
Revenue (% GDP) 21.3 23.5 
Tax revenue (% GDP)  14.2 23.5 
Government expenditure (% GDP) 20.8 18.7 
Government consumption (% GDP) 12.7 14.1 
Public investment (% GDP) 5.1 4.6 
Public debt (% GDP) 34.6 36.7 
GDP p.c. growth (%) 2.3 2.5 
Private consumption (% GDP) 64.9 48.6 
Domestic investment (% GDP) 20.8 22.3 
Capital-output ratio  2.1 2.8 
Note. The underlying equilibrium solutions are c = 0.1715, b = 0.1295, g = 0.2590, 
 h = 0.1230, and b1 = 0.9026. 
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Table 9  
Steady-State Results for Policy Experiments on the Region Average 
Policy 
variable 
 Ip/Y Cp/Y rB/Y B/Y T/Y 
b2 
      1.9 2.54 4.71 14.09 6.91 35.45 23.48 
2.0 2.50 4.59 14.12 7.12 36.68 23.54 
2.1 2.47 4.48 14.15 7.30 37.75 23.58 
2.5 2.36 4.17 14.23 7.82 40.97 23.72 
K = L 
      0.13 2.45 4.32 13.08 6.56 34.80 21.80 
0.14 2.48 4.45 13.60 6.84 35.75 22.67 
0.15 2.50 4.59 14.12 7.12 36.68 23.54 
0.16 2.52 4.72 14.65 7.41 37.60 24.41 
0.17 2.54 4.85 15.17 7.69 38.51 25.29 
C 
      0.18 2.44 4.41 13.60 6.86 35.59 22.66 
0.19 2.47 4.50 13.86 6.99 36.14 23.10 
0.20 2.50 4.59 14.12 7.12 36.68 23.54 
0.21 2.53 4.67 14.38 7.25 37.21 23.96 
0.22 2.56 4.76 14.63 7.37 37.73 24.39 
a  
      0.50 2.89 5.89 11.97 9.02 44.38 23.94 
0.55 2.70 5.23 13.05 8.06 40.54 23.73 
0.60 2.50 4.59 14.12 7.12 36.68 23.54 
0.65 2.28 3.95 15.17 6.19 32.77 23.34 
0.70 2.04 3.34 16.21 5.28 28.81 23.16 
v 
      0.80 3.19 4.65 14.06 7.05 33.49 23.44 
0.85 2.90 4.63 14.08 7.08 34.75 23.47 
0.90 2.50 4.59 14.12 7.12 36.68 23.54 
0.95 1.84 4.51 14.19 7.20 40.33 23.65 
Note. Benchmark case in bold type. 
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Table 10 
 Steady-State Results for “High Debt, High Tax” Scenario 
Policy 
variable 
 Ip/Y Cp/Y rB/Y B/Y T/Y 
benchmark 2.44 4.73 18.02 10.44 50.99 30.04 
b2 
      3.1 2.42 4.68 18.01 10.50 51.39 30.02 
3.5 2.37 4.53 18.02 10.72 52.81 30.04 
K = L
      0.22 2.45 4.92 19.13 11.11 52.87 31.88 
0.24 2.50 5.10 20.30 11.80 54.70 33.80 
0.26 2.45 5.25 21.40 12.52 56.47 35.66 
0.28 2.44 5.40 22.56 13.24 58.17 37.60 
C
      0.26 2.48 4.87 18.50 10.71 52.07 30.84 
0.28 2.52 5.00 18.97 10.98 53.12 31.62 
0.30 2.56 5.12 19.42 11.24 54.14 32.37 
0.32 2.59 5.24 19.87 11.50 55.12 33.11 
0.33 2.61 5.30 20.08 11.62 55.60 33.47 
a1 
      0.50 2.80 5.99 15.02 13.03 60.95 30.04 
0.55 2.63 5.36 16.52 11.73 56.04 30.04 
v 
      0.80 3.14 4.84 18.02 10.40 46.83 30.04 
0.85 2.84 4.80 18.02 10.42 48.48 30.04 
Note. The following parameters were changed to achieve the ―high debt, high tax‖ 
benchmark: K = L = 0.20; C = 0.24; b2 = 3. The underlying equilibrium solutions 
are c = 0.1698, b = 0.1898, g = 0.2846, h = 0.1399 and b1 = 0.9475. 
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Table 11 
 Steady-State Results for “Low Debt, Low Tax” Scenario 
Policy 
variable 
 Ip/Y Cp/Y rB/Y B/Y T/Y 
benchmark 2.21 3.56 10.68 5.34 29.86 17.80 
b2 
      2.1 2.18 3.48 10.70 5.48 30.74 17.83 
2.5 2.08 3.24 10.75 5.87 33.37 17.91 
2.8 2.02 3.12 10.77 6.07 34.74 17.96 
K = L
      0.13 2.28 3.85 11.72 5.89 31.89 19.53 
0.14 2.32 3.99 12.25 6.17 32.89 20.41 
0.15 2.35 4.13 12.78 6.45 33.87 21.29 
0.18 2.42 4.53 14.39 7.32 36.76 23.98 
0.20 2.46 4.79 15.48 7.92 38.62 25.80 
0.22 2.49 5.04 16.59 8.54 40.43 27.65 
C
      0.18 2.33 3.85 11.52 5.75 31.71 19.20 
0.20 2.40 4.04 12.06 6.02 32.88 20.10 
0.22 2.46 4.22 12.58 6.28 34.00 20.97 
0.25 2.55 4.49 13.34 6.65 35.61 22.23 
0.26 2.58 4.58 13.58 6.77 36.13 22.64 
a1 
      0.50 2.58 4.55 9.01 6.73 35.98 18.02 
0.55 2.40 4.05 9.85 6.03 32.94 17.91 
v 
      0.80 2.87 3.61 10.63 5.28 27.27 17.72 
0.85 2.60 3.59 10.65 5.31 28.29 17.76 
Note. The following parameters were changed to achieve the ―low debt, low tax‖ 
benchmark: K = L = 0.11; C = 0.15. The underlying equilibrium solutions are c = 
0.1705, b = 0.0971, g = 0.1942, h = 0.1081 and b1 = 0.9. 
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Table 12 
 Steady-State Results for “High Debt, Low Tax” Scenario 
Policy 
variable 
 Ip/Y Cp/Y rB/Y B/Y T/Y 
benchmark 2.52 4.40 8.26 8.61 46.32 18.36 
b2 
      2.5 2.60 4.63 8.23 8.20 43.72 18.28 
K = L
      0.13 2.60 4.76 9.10 9.51 49.54 20.23 
0.15 2.67 5.12 9.96 10.44 52.69 22.13 
0.18 2.75 5.63 11.28 11.88 57.29 25.06 
0.20 2.79 5.96 12.18 12.87 60.26 27.07 
0.25 2.86 6.74 14.54 15.48 67.42 32.30 
0.28 2.88 7.17 16.02 17.14 71.51 35.59 
C
      0.20 2.72 5.01 9.36 9.75 51.18 20.81 
0.25 2.90 5.59 10.39 10.80 55.61 23.09 
0.30 3.05 6.14 11.35 11.80 59.68 25.23 
0.35 3.18 6.65 12.26 12.73 63.43 27.24 
a1 
      0.35 2.82 5.32 6.53 10.31 53.57 18.64 
0.40 2.67 4.85 7.40 9.46 49.95 18.50 
v 
      0.80 3.22 4.47 8.23 8.54 42.37 18.28 
0.85 2.93 4.44 8.24 8.57 43.93 18.32 
Note. The following parameters were changed to achieve the ―high debt, low tax‖ 
benchmark: K = L = 0.11; C = 0.15; a1 = 0.45; b2 = 2.95. The underlying 
equilibrium solutions are c = 0.1818, b = 0.1566, g = 0.2368, h = 0.1113 and b1 = 
0.9189. 
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Figure 1. Over time averages of government size relative to GDP per capita growth 
by country. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of estimation observations according to government size and 
GDP Growth. 
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Panel (a) Full Sample 
 
 
 
 
Panel (b) Developing Countries 
 
 
Panel (c) Developed Countries 
 
 
Figure 3. Likelihood ratio (LR1) statistics and confidence intervals for threshold 
inference. The confidence interval of the threshold estimate consists of those values 
of government size for which the LR1 statistic is less than the critical value. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Country Sets 
 
 Developed Countries (28): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, and United States of America. 
 Developing Countries
53
 (108): Africa - Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. Americas - Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela. Asia - Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Macao , Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Yemen. Europe and Central Asia - Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Turkey, Ukraine. Oceania - Fiji, Papua New 
Guinea, Tonga, Vanuatu. 
 
 
 
Table A1      
Descriptive Statistics over time Averages      
Variable  
1971-
2005 
1971-
1975 
1976-
1980 
1981-
1985 
1986-
1990 
1991-
1995 
1996-
2000 
2001-
2005 
         
GROWTH 2.1 2.7 2.9 1.0 2.1 0.6 2.3 3.1 
GOV 28.1 25.4 28.0 30.9 28.6 29.4 27.6 26.8 
PR_GOV 8.0 7.7 8.5 8.9 8.4 8.0 7.2 7.1 
LINI_GDP 7.9 7.9 7.9 8.0 7.8 8.0 7.9 7.9 
INF 40.7 17.7 15.2 17.0 57.5 139.3 16.1 5.9 
INV 22.0 21.4 23.5 22.8 22.0 22.2 21.2 21.8 
OPEN 77.4 57.3 68.5 73.2 74.3 77.2 82.3 92.4 
SCH 5.7 4.7 4.7 5.4 5.2 6.0 6.3 6.5 
GOV_EFF 34.8 58.2 43.9 45.7 28.4 32.0 26.2 27.4 
 
  
                                                 
53
 Decomposition by geographical region based on data from the United Nations Statistics Division. 
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Table A2 
  Data Sources and Variables Description 
 Variable Mnemonic Description 
   IMF, Government Finance Statistics  
Total central government expenditure GOV Total government expenditure for the consolidated 
central government net of interest payments (% 
GDP). 
Productive central government expenditure  PR_GOV Sum of expenditure on education, health, housing 
and transport and communication as defined using 
the functional classification of the GFS. Measured 
as % GDP. 
   
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
Annual average growth in GDP p.c. GROWTH Annual percentage growth rate of GDP p.c. based 
on constant local currency. 
Log initial GDP p.c. (constant 2000 $US) LINI_GDP Logarithmic transformation of initial GDP p.c. in 
constant 2000 U.S. dollars. Initial GDP is 
measured as the value at the start of each five-year 
period. 
Inflation rate (%) INF Based on annual percentage change in consumer 
price index. 
Investment  INV Gross capital formation as % of GDP. 
Exports + Imports as % of GDP OPEN Sum of exports and imports of goods and services. 
   
Barro and Lee (2001)   
Average years of schooling SCH Average schooling years in the total population at 
the end of each preceding 5-year period. 
   
World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators  
Government effectiveness indicator GOV_EFF Captures perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. Higher 
values correspond to more effective government. 
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Table A3 
    Productive Government Spending Sub-samples 
 Estimation technique: Two-way FE     
Dependent variable: Real GDP p.c. growth       
 
Developed Developing 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     PR_GOV -0.186 
 
-0.240 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.080) 
 PR_GOVI(GOV≤32) 
 
-0.077 
  
  
(0.299) 
  PR_GOVI(GOV>32) 
 
-0.203 
  
  
(0.005) 
  PR_GOVI(GOV≤33) 
   
0.093 
    
(0.587) 
PR_GOVI(GOV>33) 
   
-0.196 
    
(0.128) 
LINI_GDP -5.799 -5.719 -9.599 -10.16 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
INF -0.005 -0.006 -0.0004 -0.0002 
 
(0.316) (0.268) (0.693) (0.759) 
INV 0.238 0.189 0.253 0.297 
 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) 
OPEN 0.0450 0.0403 0.018 0.020 
 
(0.046) (0.045) (0.419) (0.365) 
Constant 49.32 49.81 65.32 66.68 
 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
     Observations 120 120 274 274 
Number of countries 25 25 78 78 
R-squared 0.586 0.614 0.432 0.476 
Wald test 1=2 (p-value) 
 
0.001 
 
0.005 
Note. Robust p-values in parentheses. Time dummies included but not reported. 
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Table A4 
  
 
  
 
Sensitivity Analysis – Alternative Composition of Covariates  
  
 
Estimation Technique: Two-way FE 
 
 
  
 
Dependent variable: Real GDP p.c. growth 
 
 
  
 
Variable 
INF 
omitted 
INV 
omitted 
OPEN 
omitted 
SCH 
included 
Low Government 
Effectiveness 
High Government 
Effectiveness 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GOV 
  
 -0.058 
 
 
   
 (0.014) 
 
 
GOVI(GOV≤) -0.019 -0.004 -0.006 
 
0.004 0.023 
 
(0.564) (0.914) (0.872) 
 
(0.932) (0.595) 
GOVI(GOV>) -0.050 -0.037 -0.042 
 
-0.079 -0.026 
 
(0.049) (0.201) (0.129) 
 
(0.058) (0.443) 
LINI_GDP -7.491 -6.804 -6.950 -5.907 -9.277 -7.238 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INF 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.020 
  
(0.001) (0.004) (0.014) (0.078) (0.000) 
INV 0.214 
 
0.209 0.131 0.323 0.176 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OPEN 0.029 0.039  0.026 0.048 0.022 
 
(0.002) (0.000)  (0.003) (0.088) (0.016) 
SCH 
  
 0.493 
 
 
   
 (0.024) 
 
 
Constant 53.252 51.920 51.256 42.953 54.833 59.465 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 592 565 563 438 258 299 
No. of countries 143 136 136 96 75 61 
R-squared 0.379 0.335 0.380 0.349 0.492 0.513 
Wald test 1=2 (p-value) 0.036 0.039 0.018   0.002 0.007 
Note. Robust p-values in parentheses. Time dummies included but not reported.. = 33 in all specifications except column (6) when  =30.  
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Table A5             
Sensitivity Analysis - Developing Country Regressions by Region, FE 
   Africa   America   Asia   ECA  
  Variable  ˆ = 35   ˆ = 34   ˆ = 41   ˆ = 33  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
              
GOV -0.062 0.347  -0.166 0.109  0.053 0.416  0.113 1.049  
 (0.379) (0.200)  (0.030) (0.482)  (0.482) (0.166)  (0.283) (0.057)  
GOV2  -0.006   -0.006   -0.006   -0.013  
  (0.149)   (0.168)   (0.143)   (0.060)  
GOVI(GOV≤)   0.065   -0.124   0.196   0.197 
   (0.450)   (0.040)   (0.090)   (0..090) 
GOVI(GOV>)   -0.026   -0.180   0.090   0.124 
   (0.701)   (0.017)   (0.275)   (0.239) 
LINI_GDP -6.543 -7.692 -7.267 -7.848 -7.836 -7.733 -6.039 -6.373 -6.326 -15.714 -17.386 -15.998 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INF -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.065 -0.055 -0.050 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.015) (0.039) (0.035) (0.029) (0.067) (0.072) (0.026) (0.074) (0.080) (0.088) (0.070) (0.181) 
INV 0.174 0.221 0.213 0.185 0.173 0.181 0.097 0.117 0.116 0.274 0.307 0.285 
 (0.034) (0.017) (0.010) (0.011) (0.022) (0.014) (0.246) (0.210) (0.239) (0.011) (0.003) (0.006) 
OPEN 0.045 0.036 0.049 0.020 0.018 0.016 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.013 -0.052 -0.025 
 (0.359) (0.449) (0.297) (0.483) (0.523) (0.579) (0.903) (0.904) (0.787) (0.670) (0.117) (0.517) 
Constant 39.620 41.120 40.617 61.480 58.960 60.210 40.126 37.189 38.314 107.678 109.322 109.191 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 118 118 118 110 110 110 97 97 97 59 59 59 
No. of countries 35 35 35 26 26 26 22 22 22 20 20 20 
R-squared 0.437 0.464 0.497 0.589 0.596 0.607 0.456 0.468 0.509 0.924 0.930 0.930 
Wald test 1=2 (p-value)   0.011   0.025   0.024   0.040 
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Table A6             
Sensitivity Analysis - Income Class Subsamples, FE 
 Low Income Lower Middle Income Upper Middle Income High Income 
Variable  ˆ = 30   ˆ = 33   ˆ = 49   ˆ = 30  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
GOV -0.035 0.242  -0.198 -0.173  -0.050 -0.315  -0.114 -0.423  
 (0.647) (0.288)  (0.000) (0.256)  (0.491) (0.102)  (0.030) (0.030)  
GOV2  -0.006   -0.000   0.004   0.004  
  (0.220)   (0.843)   (0.111)   (0.058)  
GOVI(GOV≤   0.073   -0.109   -0.096   -0.016 
   (0.333)   (0.041)   (0.183)   (0.774) 
GOVI(GOV>   -0.042   -0.164   -0.026   -0.077 
   (0.537)   (0.000)   (0.732)   (0.092) 
LINI_GDP -4.703 -5.260 -5.223 -8.662 -8.687 -8.729 -11.727 -12.125 -11.980 -6.766 -7.019 -6.882 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INF -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.018 -0.017 -0.017 0.014 -0.010 0.007 
 (0.040) (0.048) (0.032) (0.064) (0.066) (0.057) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.117) (0.375) (0.406) 
INV 0.293 0.302 0.335 0.274 0.276 0.294 0.401 0.389 0.380 0.045 0.047 0.042 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.625) (0.605) (0.623) 
OPEN 0.074 0.077 0.101 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.027 0.032 0.036 0.019 0.016 0.023 
 (0.068) (0.064) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.167) (0.090) (0.053) (0.413) (0.488) (0.271) 
Constant 18.253 18.603 17.973 57.570 57.355 55.903 87.023 93.561 89.785 66.297 74.593 65.432 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 93 93 93 158 158 158 129 129 129 177 177 177 
No. of countries 31 31 31 41 41 41 31 31 31 33 33 33 
R-squared 0.456 0.464 0.541 0.562 0.562 0.577 0.691 0.696 0.705 0.402 0.418 0.432 
Wald test 1=2    0.000   0.059   0.035   0.015 
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Table A7 
        Sensitivity Analysis - Alternative Sample Periods        
Estimation technique: Two-way FE 
       Dependent variable: Real GDP p.c. growth       
Variable 1981-2005 1986-2005 1991-2005 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          GOV -0.063 -0.119 
 
-0.046 -0.117 
 
0.006 -0.169 
 
 
(0.089) (0.175) 
 
(0.320) (0.383) 
 
(0.932) (0.473) 
 GOV2 
 
0.001 
  
0.001 
  
0.003 
 
  
(0.398) 
  
(0.557) 
  
(0.411) 
 GOVI(GOV≤33) 
 
0.018 
  
0.049 
  
0.099 
   
(0.658) 
  
(0.324) 
  
(0.209) 
GOVI(GOV>33) 
 
-0.042 
  
-0.022 
  
0.037 
   
(0.208) 
  
(0.606) 
  
(0.585) 
LINI_GDP -9.542 -9.450 -9.671 -11.650 -11.573 -11.885 -16.945 -16.804 -16.938 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INF -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.089) (0.092) (0.076) (0.104) (0.103) (0.078) (0.239) (0.206) (0.238) 
INV 0.259 0.257 0.270 0.317 0.316 0.320 0.403 0.399 0.399 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OPEN 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.021 0.017 0.031 0.036 0.027 
 
(0.241) (0.233) (0.220) (0.161) (0.131) (0.160) (0.028) (0.018) (0.056) 
Constant 69.319 69.540 68.572 85.224 85.489 85.377 122.228 123.243 120.805 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
          Observations 447 447 447 381 381 381 302 302 302 
No. of countries 135 135 135 134 134 134 126 126 126 
R-squared 0.438 0.438 0.456 0.532 0.533 0.556 0.624 0.625 0.636 
Wald test 1=2 (p-value) 
  
0.011 
  
0.003 
  
0.060 
Robust p-values in parentheses. Time dummies not reported.   
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Table A8 
Threshold Identification and Inference Subsamples 
Sub-sample 
Threshold estimate 
ˆ  
LR0 
 Regional groups  
Africa 35 8.459 
Americas 34 3.250 
Asia 41 6.896 
Europe 33 1.646 
 Income classes  
Low income 30 9.262 
Lower -middle income 33 3.629 
Upper -middle income 49 4.049 
High income 30 6.848 
 Productive expenditure  
Full sample 33 12.419 
Developed countries 32 5.921 
Developing countries 33 15.298 
Note. Regional decomposition is for developing countries only. 
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APPENDIX B 
Table B1 
Variations in the Elasticity of Production of Human Capital 
Parameter 
Benchmark 
v = 0.90 
v = 0.85 v = 0.80 
 = 0.30 2.50 2.90 3.19 
 = 0.15 2.02 2.26 2.43 
= 0.10 1.81 1.98 2.09 
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